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The decision to default is usually reached after a painful process in which the country (or 
the country’s authorities) agonize over the decision. Fears of being ostracized from the 
international financial community, of being subject to trade sanctions, or to be repudiated 
economically and politically contribute to the perception of the costliness of default. 
Historical experience reinforces this view in light of the protracted negotiations that 
followed each default episode, at least prior to the 1990s. 
 
Case studies of recent default experiences show an impressive common pattern.
2 In most 
cases, an extremely fragile political system, using a fixed exchange rate to gain 
credibility and stability, runs unsustainable fiscal policies. Eventually the exchange rate 
regime instability becomes banking sector uncertainty due to two factors. First, the fear 
of devaluation combined with balance sheet risk puts at risk the solvency of the balance 
sheets of the banks. Second, fears of default affect directly the asset side of banks balance 
sheets.
3 Eventually, the capital outflows resulting from the fears of a banking collapse 
trigger the collapse of the currency, forcing a bailout of the financial sector, which makes 
the government bankrupt. The output collapse as a result of the financial sector crisis also 
contributes to the payment difficulties. In some cases this vicious circle is fed by negative 
sentiment and negative market expectations that make the adjustment even more difficult 
and costly. Thus, while the specifics may differ in each case defaults are, in general, the 
result of a combination of serious mismanagement of local policies, fiscal imbalances, 
overvalued exchange rates and financial crises.  
 
In some cases the process leading to default may be self justifying. If market participants 
become skeptical about a country paying its debt (due to sustainability fears or j ust the 
perception that the country is unwilling to pay), this will immediately trigger a liquidity 
crunch. In the extreme, the country is unable to roll over the debt and is forced into 
default. 
 
The idea of this chapter is to provide a number of tools that may allow an independent 
observer to assess the likelihood of default, to provide the clues for an evaluation of 
likely restructuring scenarios and to be able to estimate possible financial and real 
implications of such an event. We divide our Toolkit into seven exercises. In all cases our 
idea is to provide the needed elements so that the researcher applies directly the Toolkit to 
the country of analysis. Our exercises involve:   
 
1.  Establishing a set of warning signals.  
2.  Discussing static solvency analysis. 
3.  Estimating the probability of default of sovereign bonds. 
4.  Understanding the basics of debt sustainability analysis. 
5.  Estimating possible debt restructuring scenarios. 
6.  Assessing the financial costs of default. 
7.  Evaluating the output effects of default. 
 
                                               
2  See Sturzenegger (2002).  
3 Powell and Sturzenegger (2002) have shown that balance sheet effects transform currency risk into 
country risk in dollarized economies, thus providing evidence on the relevance of the balance sheet effect.   3
We discuss each of these in turn.   4
 Tool # 1. Establishing a Set of Warning Signals 
 
Objective: To identify macroeconomic indicators that may signal the risk of debt 
problems.  
 
How to define the macroeconomic scenario that triggers a debt problem is one of the 
most important tasks of an analyst trying to anticipate possible restructuring events. As 
we mentioned above there is a striking common pattern in debt problems during the 90s: 
a weak fiscal situation combined with current account problems lead to fears of 
devaluation and default, triggering a bank run which plunges the economy into recession 
aggravating the fiscal scenario. Eventually, the collapse of the economy and the need for 
fiscal resources to keep the financial sector afloat lead to the default decision.
4 Thus an 
effective early warning system will probably have to start by looking carefully at the 
external situation of the country (also assessing its vulnerability to external shocks), at the 
fiscal situation and at the soundness of the banking sector.    
 
While there are relatively standard techniques to study current account sustainability, 
fiscal soundness, or banking sector problems in isolation, we will focus here on how to 




Consider a sovereign bond that matures in one period. No arbitrage opportunities 
between assets imply that, in a risk neutral world, the default inclusive rate of return on 
the sovereign bond should equal to the rate of return from risk free asset, i.e. 
 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( r IPD R IPD i + = · + - · + ,                                                          (1) 
 
where  IPD refers to the implicit probability of default,  i  denotes the yield on the 
sovereign bonds, r is the yield on US treasury bills with identical maturity date and size 
as that of the sovereign bond, and R indicates historical recovery values of bonds in the 
event of default. 
 
This equation indicates that the return ( i) if there is no default (which happens with 
probability  1-IPD) plus the recovery value ( R) in the event of default (which happens 
with probability IPD), have to equal in expected value the risk free rate r.  
 
Equation (1) can be simplified to yield:  
 
IPD = ( )












  ,                          (2)           
 
                                               
4 There is an ample literature that relates banking crises with currency crises. See Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999) and Glick and Hutchison (1999). 
5 On current account sustainability see Deutsche Bank (2000) and Edwards (2001). On banking soundness 
see Caprio, Honohan and Vittas (2002). We develop an analysis of fiscal solvency in Tool #4.    5
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Note that the spreads as defined here are the geometric spreads, i.e. the ratio of the rates 
of return on two assets. This definition of S is preferred to the usual approximation i – r, 
so that our probability of default is appropriately bounded between 0 and 1.
6  
 
In short, equation (2) indicates that the higher the spread, given an expected recovery 
value, the higher the probability of default. Thus, under the assumption of relatively 
stable or exogenous recovery values, the determinants of spreads are good indicators of 
the probability of default, and, therefore, of impending payment problems.   
 
Rather than building a model for spreads from zero we use, as benchmark, a market 
based model of spreads. In particular we use Goldman Sachs’ Equilibrium Sovereign 
Spread model (GS-ESS), presented in Ades  et al (2000). The model estimates the 
sovereign spread a country should have, on the basis of some selected fundamentals. The 
model considers fundamentals related to the country’s solvency position, liquidity in the 
markets and debt-service track record. Additionally to using the model to compute the 
spread that can be justified by the country’s fundamentals, the analyst can use it to 
analyze how  spreads would react to changes in each fundamental. The higher the 
equilibrium spread the weaker the fundamentals of the country. Tool # 3 teaches us how 
to transform that theoretical spread into a default probability.  
 
In order to estimate the model Ades  et al (2000) run a regression using data for 15 
emerging market economies from 1996 onwards. The sample includes countries from 
Latin America, Asia, Emerging Europe, the Middle East and Africa. For each country, 
they selected one benchmark bond, typically between 10 and 20 years maturity. The 
sample is restricted to those countries that issue long-term bonds. The model explains the 




•  Variable # 1 .  Long-run Real GDP Growth (GROWTH): r efers to monthly 
estimates of real GDP year-on-year growth, interpolated from quarterly (where 
available) or annual figures. However, rather than using the actual growth figures 
they use the permanent or trend growth to smooth the short run volatility this 
variable usually exhibits in developing countries. The purpose of introducing this 
variable is clear: The higher the growth rate the lesser the potential debt problem 
as the economy will become richer and the relative debt burden smaller.   
•  Variable # 2. Total External Debt as a Ratio of GDP (TXDY). This variable 
measures directly the debt burden. By considering the external debt, it is closely 
related to the “external transfer” issue by which higher external debt implies more 
strain on the current account and therefore a higher probability of debt problems. 
                                               
6 The approximation i-r may lead to substantial mispricing if r is large.  
   6
External debt in this specification is measured as foreign currency denominated 
debt.
7  
•  Variable # 3. Nominal Budget Balance as a Ratio of GDP (NBB). Obviously, 
the weaker public finances, the more likely debt problems. If the government runs 
an overall deficit it means that the primary surplus is unable to pay for interest, 
and therefore that the country is issuing yet more debt. On the other hand, a 
surplus indicates that the government is purchasing b ack debt and shows the 
political feasibility of reducing the debt numbers thus substantially improving the 
chances of not having debt problems.   
•  Variable # 4. Ratio of Exports of Goods and Non-Factor Services to GDP 
(XGD). This variable indicates how likely the country is to obtain the foreign 
resources to finance its external debt. A higher ratio of exports and non-factor 
services to GDP diminishes the risks associated to debt. 
•  Variable # 5. Real Exchange Rate Misalignment (MISAL). It is a measure of 
the country’s currency overvaluation (in percentage points). The more overvalued 
the currency the more likely current account problems, the lack of foreign 
resources to service the debt, or of a currency collapse that increases the debt 
burden precipitating the default. This variable is relatively difficult to measure, 
and a discussion of overvaluation is well beyond the scope of this exercise. In 
what follows the analyst can provide his own measure or just work with the model 




•  Variable # 6. Global Liquidity (LIBOR). The analyst can use as proxy for global 
liquidity conditions the GDP-weighted average nominal interest rate in G -7 
economies (this is what Goldman Sachs uses) or any international interest rate 
such as LIBOR. An increase in interest rates in developed economies implies that 
capital flows may be more likely to remain in or flow back to developed 
economies thus increasing the rollover risk in emerging economies.  
•  Variable # 7. Total External Amortizations as a Ratio of Gross International 
Reserves (TAMRES). This variable indicates the amount of debt maturing within 
one year, measured as a fraction of international reserves. It indicates the fraction 
of financing needs (over the upcoming year) that can be managed with the 
international reserves already in the hands of the government. The larger this 
number, the less exposed is that government to being forced into default due to 
lack of refinancing.  
 
A track record  variable: 
 
•  Variable # 8. Default History (DEFAULT): this variable takes the value of 1 if 
the bond in question corresponds to restructured debt and 0 otherwise. The idea is 
                                               
7 Interestingly Ades et al (2000) find that domestic debt is not a relevant variable to anticipate debt 
problems. Underlying this view, is the idea that domestic currency denominated debt can always be 
financed through money printing.    7
that if the government has a past history with defaults it is likely to default again. 
Markets tend to price this into the spreads.
8  
 
Table 1 replicates the results in Ades et al (2000), which indicate the impact on country 
spreads of a 1% increase in the explanatory variables. All the coefficients have the right 
sign and are highly significant in the econometric specification, thus providing a useful 
set of variables that can be used to identify if country fundamentals are deteriorating or 





Impact on Spreads from 
1% increase  
(in basis points) 
Long-Run Real GDP Growth  -7 
Total Amortizations / Reserves Ratio  2 
Total External debt / GDP Ratio  7 
Nominal Budget Balance  -34 
Total NFGS Exports / GDP Ratio  -3 
FX Real Misalignment  2 
Long-Run LIBOR  45 
Debt Restructure Dummy  165 (if restructured) 
  Source: Ades et al (2000) 
 
 
How can our analyst use this model?  
 
The model can be used in two ways. One such use is a simple partial-effect calculation by 
which the analyst can look at the changes in one specific variable to estimate the impact 
on equilibrium sovereign spreads. Whenever the effect is positive we say that 
fundamentals have deteriorated. If the effect is negative it means that the fundamentals 
have improved and debt problems are less likely. These simple partial effects can be read 
directly from Table 1. 
 
Alternatively, the analyst can find data for each of these variables and then plug them in 
the following equation replacing each variable by its value for the country under study.  
 
DEFAULT LIBOR MISAL
XGD NBB TXDY TAMRES GROWTH S
* 0 . 165 * 3 . 45 * 1 . 2
* 6 . 2 * 2 . 34 * 5 . 7 * 6 . 1 * 9 . 6 3 . 439
+ + +




                                               
8 Ades et al (2000) include both a default variable and a dummy for instruments arising from default 
restructurings, finding only the second dummy to come in significantly. This result, however, can be due to 
a special characteristic of Brady bonds: the fact that they mixed sovereign and US risk, thus making them 
relatively unattractive as a way of purchasing pure emerging market risk.    8
The result will deliver the equilibrium or theoretical spread which can be used in 
combination with Tool # 3, to assess the theoretical probability of default.  
 
When carrying on this exercise it is essential that the data have the same units discussed 
in the variable description, as these were used to estimate the above model. In most cases 
the units of account do not pose a problem. However as the model has been estimated by 
interpolating quarterly or annual data to monthly figures, it is important that seasonality 
components (filtered out in the above procedure) be equally cleaned in the numbers used. 
In other words in estimating equilibrium sovereign spreads it is important to “remove” 
short run volatility from some explanatory variables such as  GDP growth. An 
econometric procedure known as the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter should be used to 
effectively extract the permanent or trend component from the relevant variables. 
Standard deseasonalization can also be implemented.  
 
Except for the misalignment variable that can be excluded if no data is available (setting 
its value equal to zero) all other variables must carry a number for the exercise to make 
sense.  
 
An application to Brazil 2002 
 
Let`s ilustrate the use of this tool by applying it to Brazil by comparing the situation in 
Brazil in August 2001 with that in August 2002.  
 
First, we have to find data on the variables that are used to estimate the spreads. Most of 
the data is taken from IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics). For Long-
run Real GDP Growth (GROWTH), we used a quarterly GDP index (1990=100) on 
observed data at market prices, applied a Hodrick-Prescott filter to it and then calculated 
the long-run interannual growth rate from the filtered series for the second quarter of each 
year. We then calculated Total External Debt as a Ratio of GDP (TXDY) and the Ratio of 
Exports of Goods and Non-Factor Services to GDP (XGD) also using data from IBGE. 
We use Total External Debt stock for June 2001 and June 2002 as a percentage  of 
annualized GDP as of June 2001 and June 2002. For the XGD variable we used the 
exports accumulated in the previous 12 months to August 2001 and August 2002 as a 
percentage of annualized GDP as of August 2001 and August 2002. For the Nominal 
Budget Balance as a Ratio of GDP (NBB) we used annual figures taken from Merrill 
Lynch (2002). We assume that Real Exchange Rate Misalignment (MISAL) is 0. For 
Global Liquidity (LIBOR) we use the 1 year LIBO rate. For Total External Amortizations 
as a Ratio of Gross International Reserves (TAMRES) we use data from the joint BIS-
IMF-OECD-World Bank statistics on external debt (lines G+I, which include liabilities to 
banks due within a year and non-bank trade credits due within a year) as a percentage of 
total international reserves of the country. The Default History (DEFAULT) dummy 
takes the value 1 for Brazil because the country defaulted in the 80s. 
   9
Table 2 











































     (GROWTH)  (TXDY)  (NBB)  (XGD)  (MISAL)  (LIBOR)  (TAMRES)  (DEFAULT)     
Coeff.  -439.3  -6.9  7.5  -34.2  -2.6  2.1  45.3  1.6  165.0       
Aug-01    1.8  37.5  -5.2  10.8  0.0  3.6  95.6  1  461  563 




  0.6  50.8  147.1  -1.3  0.0  -75.7  -19.4  0  102  1.342 
 
The table indicates in the last row, by how much each variable contributes to the increase 
in country spreads. The main contributors to the deterioration of fundamentals are the 
deterioration of the budget situation and the increase  in the debt ratio. Most other 
variables contributed to a decrease in spreads.   
 
The last column, however indicates the limits of the model. While the direction of the 
change is properly captured by the identified variables, the increase in country spreads 
indicates that the risk associated to Brazilian debt holdings skyrocketed between August 
2001 and August 2002. Among the considerations to be included in this analysis and that 
are not captured by the specification, were the regional crises (for example the Argentine 
default of December 2001), the upcoming Presidential elections where left wing 
candidate Lula was favored to win, among other factors. The analyst, thus, must 
complement the analysis suggested here, which at best can provide an indication of what 
is happening with fundamentals, with a much broader view of the political and economic 
scenario. 
   10
Tool # 2. Static Solvency Analysis 
 
Objective: Provide of the bat indicators of debt problems. 
 
Some indicators are usually used to provide a first and direct glance at a country’s possible 
debt problems. These indicators are known as debt ratios and try to give an assessment of 
the burden imposed by the country’s debt.  
 
The two most important debt ratios are: (i) the debt to GDP (Debt/GDP) ratio that measures 
the size of the stock of debt relative to the economy and (ii) the interest payment due each 
year, also as a percentage of GDP (I/GDP). The Debt/GDP ratio measures how big the debt 
is and is the most general proxy for debt problems. The I/GDP ratio l ooks at the burden 
imposed on the country that specific year in terms of interest payments. These variables, 
however, are just indicative of debt problems. A country with a relatively small debt but 
facing large interest payments in the near future may default on its debt in spite of it being 
able to repay its obligations had the maturity of the debt been different. Conversely, 
countries with high debt to GDP ratios may have low interest burdens (its debt being mostly 
on concessional terms) and therefore not have a debt problem.
9  
 
The measurement of debt can be refined in several ways. Usually many analysts distinguish 
between external debt (that owed to non-residents) and domestic debt owed to residents. 
External debt ratios give a better assessment of the external resources the economy will have 
to generate in order to service its debt. Most of the time, external debt is measured by 
looking at dollar (or foreign currency) denominated debt, while domestic debt is measured 
by local currency denominated debt. Nowadays, this distinction does not make much sense 
anymore.
10 Many countries are not willing or cannot issue locally denominated debt; in 
those countries locals purchase and trade actively in foreign denominated debt and.  
 
In many countries local residents hold considerable foreign assets. An important question is 
whether relevant debt stocks should be gross debt or net of foreign assets. Following 
Hausmann and Velasco (2002) we suggest disregarding foreign assets, as these assets result 
equally or even less available in times of crises. Thus, when liquidity or solvency problems 
arise, seldom can these resources be counted upon to provide a counterweight to the burden 
of debt. An exception may be the assets of local firms abroad or those held by the foreign 
headquarters of local firms, as in both cases the firm may be willing to commit those 
resources in order to avoid harming the credit rating of the global corporation. 
 
An alternative distinction is between public and private debt. Total debt includes debt owed 
by the government (public debt) and by the private sector (private sector debt).
11 The 
                                               
9 When referring to public sector debt, debt numbers include “explicit” debt, i.e. that which is registered in 
the books of the public sector.  However, many governments have hidden liabilities arising from social 
security dynamics or unfulfilled obligations. Most debt analyses omit these items. However a careful 
assessment should not avoid looking into the potential obligations of the government in search of 
“skeletons”.  
10 Similarly, while less common, non-residents also hold locally denominated debt. 
11 Public sector debt may be classified by level of government, and so on.   11
interest to GDP ratio corresponding to public debt also determines the primary surplus the 
government has to attain in order to keep the total level of debt constant. While private debt 
should not be included in an assessment of sovereign defaults, many analysts include 
private debt burdens as part of the overall debt problem of the government. The reasoning 
behind this relies on the fact that a debt default may have consequences that go well 
beyond the interruption of debt payments and are usually associated to devaluations, 
capital controls and other disruptions in the normal operation of the economy. When this 
happens, many governments nationalize or take up part of the debt burden of the private 
sector. Anticipation of this requires adding the private sector debt burden in the 
assessment of debt problems.  
 
The interest to debt ratio (I/Debt) measures the average cost of the debt. This number is 
obviously affected by the maturity and coupon structure of the debt, but provides a first 
approximation to the yearly cost of the debt. It should be distinguished from the marginal 
cost of debt, which is the cost of new indebtedness. As an economy approaches a debt 




In order to measure potential liquidity problems it is common to use the financing 
requirement ratio. Financing requirements are usually measured in dollar terms rather than 
as a percentage of GDP. Financing requirements measure how much money the 
government, private sector or both will have to obtain in the market during a given period of 
time. Computing financing requirements implies knowing the amortization structure of the 
debt. A T -bill with a three month maturity of 3 billion will enter in the financing 
requirement numbers for the following year as 12 billion as it will have to be rolled over 
four times during that period. Financing requirements are a good i ndicator of potential 
liquidity problems. As long as the market rolls over automatically existing debt, 
amortizations are usually not considered an important part of the debt problem. However, 
once roll-over is under question, knowing how many resources the market will have to 
provide becomes essential.  
 
In order to figure out the burden of the interest payments on the budget we use the ratio of 
interest to total revenue or taxes.  If this ratio is very high it indicates that a large fraction of 
government’s income is being used for servicing the debt. Such a situation is worrisome, at 
least in terms of assuring creditors that the country will be able to maintain the political 
support for servicing the debt.  
 
There are many other debt indicators such as Debt/Exports, Interests/Exports, 
Amortizations/Reserves, among others. The analyst will have to identify which are the 
relevant indicators in his case of study. The Debt/Exports ratio, for example, is 
particularly relevant for a country that is relatively isolated from world capital markets 
and whose only source of foreign exchange are trade related activities. For countries 
better integrated the ratio becomes less significant. And so on…  
 
                                               
12 Mussa (2002) for example, in his description of the Argentine crisis confuses the two terms, thus making 
a negative assessment of the debt situation that was not warranted by the facts.    12
 
Table 3 illustrates the usefulness and the drawbacks of debt ratios for some arbitrarily 
selected emerging economies. The table includes two groups. The first includes the 
countries that defaulted on their debt during the 90s.
13 The second is a group of non 
defaulters.  
 
Among the first group, Pakistan shows the largest debt burdens both in terms of debt to 
GDP ratios as well as in terms of the size of resources absorbed by interest payments. 
Ecuador shows a slightly smaller debt to GDP ratio, but its low average cost (as a result 
of recent debt restructurings and concessional lending), reduces substantially the size of 
interest payments. Yet, as a percentage of tax revenues the cost remains sizable. The 
other countries, with differences, show a much more manageable picture, both in terms of 
debt ratios, required primary surpluses and share of taxes used for interest payments.  
 
Table 3 
  Defaulters  Non-defaulters 
  Argentina  Ecuador  Pakistan  Russia  Ukraine  Colombia  Mexico  Venezuela  Poland 
Year end before the 
crisis  (2000)  (1998)  (1998)  (1997)  (1999)         
Interest/GDP  3.4  3.2  7.1  4.8  2.4  5.0  2.6  3.3  2.9 
Interest/Taxes  26.1  44.9  52.2  48.4  7.4  25.3  25.7  18.7  11.0 
Interest/Public Debt  7.5  4.0  7.5  9.0  3.8  9.8  9.4  9.3  7.4 
Public Debt/GDP  44.9  80.0  94.3  52.5  62.8  50.8  27.7  35.3  39.1 
Source: IMF, GS estimates 
 
While these indicators allow us to identify most obviously problematic cases, it is clear from 
the table that it is difficult to assess a problem country from static indicators alone. For 
example, Table 4 shows no major difference in terms of debt burdens between the group of 





and Russia  
Colombia, Venezuela, 
México and Poland 
Developing Countries  
(2000) 
Interest/GDP  3.5  3.5  2.0 
Interest/Taxes  27.3  20.2  N/A 
Interest/Public Debt  6.8  9.0  5.0 
Public Debt/GDP  53.4  38.2  22.6 
Source: IMF, GS estimates, Global Development Finance (WB). 
 
Why do static debt indicators work so poorly? Debt problems, by definition have to do with 
an intertemporal problem. Debt burdens may be considered a problem or not depending on 
whether the analyst thinks that in the future the country will be able to honor its obligations 
or not. Thus, it is less important where the country stands today, relative to where analysts 
and market participants think the country will be in the future. How to take into account the 
                                               
13 To make the comparison meaningful for these countries we include the numbers prior to default.   13
future is the objective of Tool # 4. However, in spite of its limitations, the analysis of debt 
ratios remains one of the most important methods of analysis of debt problems.  
 
   14
Tool # 3. Estimating the Probability of Default with a Fixed Recovery 
Value 
 
Objective: Estimate the probability of default implicit in sovereign bond prices.  
 
In this tool we provide a simple way to estimate the implicit probability of default (IPD) 
of sovereign bonds using the yield on sovereign bonds (i), the yield on US treasury bills 
with identical maturity date and size as that of the sovereign bond (r) and an estimate for 
the recovery values of bonds (R). 
 
Imagine a bond that matures in one period.
14 As we saw in Tool # 1 the no arbitrage 
condition implies that 
 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( r IPD R IPD i + = · + - · + .                                                          (4) 
 
which can be simplified to yield:  
 
IPD = ( )
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Equation (5) can be readily used to estimate the probability of default as long as an 
estimate of R is available. 
 
While the above assumes that the bond has a maturity of one period the above 
computation extends to the case of a bond with longer maturities as long as the 
probability of default is distributed uniformly over the life of the bond.
15  
 
To see this assume a multiperiod bond with a constant probability of default that we will 
model as a Poisson process with parameter l. The probability of no default from time 
zero until time t is then e
-lt. The annualized probability of default is (1-e
-l) which is 
approximately l when l is not too large. 
 
Under the assumption of recovery value R for one dollar of principal, the market price of 
a bond paying annual coupon C should be 
 
                                               
14 The formula provides the probability of default corresponding to the time frame specified in the interest 
rate return.  
15 This presentation follows closely the exercise done in JP Morgan (2000).   15
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 is the probability of default from 
period 0 to period i.  
 
Consider a par floater paying an annual coupon of 1 + i =  rS S r + + .
16 Then the price of 
the par floater is 
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that gives, once again, an implicit probability of default  
 
IPD = ( )
















  .          (6) 
 
As can be readily seen from the equation an essential piece in the estimation is the 
recovery value R. Tool # 4 provides some insights as to how to compute the recovery 
values. 
                                               
16 Remember we defined S= 1
1
1








, so  ( )( ) r S i + + = + 1 1 1  and  rS S r i + + = .   16
Using the table  
 
The computation of equation (6) is presented in Table 5 (see also Tables 5.1 to 5.11 in the 
appendix for different interest rate assumptions) for different assumptions regarding 
recovery values and spreads, given a risk free interest rate. The analyst can use this table 
to assess quickly the probability of default in his/her country of analysis. For example, for 
a recovery value of 50% and a spread of 350bps., the table indicates the market is 
assigning a 6.2% probability of default over the upcoming year.
17   
 
Table 5 
                                               
17 The probability of default is estimated for the time period corresponding to the interest rates considered.  
Implicit probability of default
i
Recovery Value (as a % of principal)
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
50 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 1.1% 1.4% 1.9% 3.1%
100 1.1% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.8% 2.2% 2.8% 3.8% 5.9%
150 1.6% 1.8% 2.0% 2.3% 2.7% 3.3% 4.2% 5.6% 8.6%
200 2.2% 2.4% 2.7% 3.1% 3.6% 4.4% 5.5% 7.3% 11.2%
250 2.7% 3.0% 3.4% 3.8% 4.5% 5.4% 6.7% 9.0% 13.6%
300 3.2% 3.6% 4.0% 4.6% 5.3% 6.4% 8.0% 10.6% 15.9%
350 3.7% 4.1% 4.6% 5.3% 6.2% 7.4% 9.2% 12.2% 18.1%
400 4.2% 4.7% 5.3% 6.0% 7.0% 8.3% 10.4% 13.7% 20.1%
450 4.7% 5.2% 5.9% 6.7% 7.8% 9.3% 11.5% 15.1% 22.1%
500 5.2% 5.8% 6.5% 7.4% 8.6% 10.2% 12.6% 16.5% 23.9%
550 5.7% 6.3% 7.1% 8.1% 9.4% 11.1% 13.7% 17.9% 25.7%
600 6.2% 6.9% 7.7% 8.7% 10.1% 12.0% 14.8% 19.2% 27.4%
650 6.7% 7.4% 8.3% 9.4% 10.9% 12.9% 15.8% 20.5% 29.0%
700 7.2% 7.9% 8.9% 10.1% 11.6% 13.7% 16.8% 21.7% 30.6%
750 7.6% 8.4% 9.4% 10.7% 12.3% 14.6% 17.8% 22.9% 32.1%
800 8.1% 9.0% 10.0% 11.3% 13.1% 15.4% 18.8% 24.1% 33.5%
850 8.6% 9.5% 10.6% 12.0% 13.8% 16.2% 19.7% 25.2% 34.9%
900 9.0% 10.0% 11.1% 12.6% 14.5% 17.0% 20.7% 26.3% 36.2%
950 9.5% 10.5% 11.7% 13.2% 15.1% 17.8% 21.6% 27.4% 37.4%
1000 9.9% 11.0% 12.2% 13.8% 15.8% 18.5% 22.4% 28.4% 38.6%
1050 10.4% 11.4% 12.7% 14.4% 16.5% 19.3% 23.3% 29.4% 39.8%
1100 10.8% 11.9% 13.3% 14.9% 17.1% 20.0% 24.1% 30.4% 40.9%
1150 11.3% 12.4% 13.8% 15.5% 17.8% 20.7% 25.0% 31.3% 42.0%
1200 11.7% 12.9% 14.3% 16.1% 18.4% 21.5% 25.8% 32.2% 43.0%
1250 12.1% 13.3% 14.8% 16.6% 19.0% 22.2% 26.6% 33.1% 44.0%
1300 12.5% 13.8% 15.3% 17.2% 19.6% 22.8% 27.3% 34.0% 45.0%
1350 13.0% 14.2% 15.8% 17.7% 20.2% 23.5% 28.1% 34.9% 45.9%
1400 13.4% 14.7% 16.3% 18.3% 20.8% 24.2% 28.8% 35.7% 46.8%
1450 13.8% 15.1% 16.8% 18.8% 21.4% 24.8% 29.5% 36.5% 47.7%
1500 14.2% 15.6% 17.2% 19.3% 22.0% 25.5% 30.3% 37.3% 48.6%
1550 14.6% 16.0% 17.7% 19.8% 22.5% 26.1% 31.0% 38.1% 49.4%
1600 15.0% 16.4% 18.2% 20.4% 23.1% 26.7% 31.6% 38.8% 50.2%
1650 15.4% 16.9% 18.7% 20.9% 23.6% 27.3% 32.3% 39.5% 50.9%
1700 15.8% 17.3% 19.1% 21.4% 24.2% 27.9% 33.0% 40.3% 51.7%
1750 16.2% 17.7% 19.6% 21.8% 24.7% 28.5% 33.6% 41.0% 52.4%
1800 16.6% 18.1% 20.0% 22.3% 25.3% 29.1% 34.2% 41.6% 53.1%
1850 16.9% 18.5% 20.5% 22.8% 25.8% 29.6% 34.9% 42.3% 53.8%
1900 17.3% 18.9% 20.9% 23.3% 26.3% 30.2% 35.5% 43.0% 54.5%
1950 17.7% 19.3% 21.3% 23.7% 26.8% 30.7% 36.1% 43.6% 55.1%
2000 18.1% 19.7% 21.7% 24.2% 27.3% 31.3% 36.6% 44.2% 55.7%
2500 21.6% 23.5% 25.8% 28.5% 31.9% 36.3% 42.0% 49.8% 61.1%
3000 24.9% 27.0% 29.4% 32.4% 36.0% 40.6% 46.5% 54.3% 65.4%
3500 27.9% 30.1% 32.7% 35.9% 39.7% 44.3% 50.3% 58.1% 68.8%
4000 30.6% 33.0% 35.7% 39.0% 42.9% 47.7% 53.6% 61.3% 71.6%
4500 33.2% 35.6% 38.5% 41.8% 45.8% 50.6% 56.5% 64.1% 73.9%
5000 35.5% 38.1% 41.0% 44.4% 48.4% 53.2% 59.1% 66.5% 75.9%
5500 37.8% 40.3% 43.3% 46.8% 50.8% 55.6% 61.4% 68.5% 77.6%


























The probabilities of default increase as we move to the right in the table. Higher recovery 
values imply that a given spread can only be rationalized if there is a higher probability of 
default. Likewise, the higher the spreads, the higher the probability of default. 
 
 
Using credit default swaps to estimate default probabilities
18 
 
Default probabilities can also be calculated from information implied in credit default 
swap spreads. To evaluate the risk premium (credit spread) of an instrument we have to 
compute the difference between the present value of the risky asset versus the risk-free 
investment of $1 for one period.  
 
In the event of default, the buyer would deliver a bond and would get paid $100. In the 
event of no default, the buyer would get paid nothing. Thus, the net value of the default 
payment is the difference between the cheapest bond that the investor can buy in the 
market and the $100 payment.  
 
Call R the bond price within 30 days of a default. The swap value in the event of default 
is 100 – R (assume par = 100). Let Pd be the probability of default. For the swap contract 
to have zero initial value (fairly priced), the expected gain from default must be equal to 
the premium paid. 
 
Expected gain from default = PV.[Pd (100-R)]=PV.[Premium]    (7) 
 
Or, Pd = (Premium)/(100-R)              (8)   
       
for instant default protection. Let’s look at an example. Since the credit default swaps are 
quoted on an annual basis, a spread of 3000 bps would cost $15 in 6 months. Assume the 
bond price in the aftermath of default is $20 per $100. The probability of default over the 
six-month time frame would be:  
 
Pd = (Premium) /(100-R) = (15)/(100-20) » 18.75%. 
 
Table 6 shows the sensitivity to the price of the cheapest asset within 30 days of default 
using the Brazil CDS spreads mid-June. 
 
Table 6. Sensitivity of Recovery Value 
Recovery Values  Probability of Default 
0.15  28.3% 
0.20  30.0% 
0.25  31.5% 
0.30  33.3% 
 Source: Bloomberg 
 
                                               
18 This section follows closely Merril Lynch (2002).   18
While the CDS market may be useful to provide an alternative estimation of the default 
probability, one should be aware that, on occasions, the market becomes extremely thin. 
Once trading stops CDS may provide a distorted view of default probabilities. 
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Tool # 4. Debt Sustainability 
 
Objective: To assess if the government will be able to honor its debt obligations and to 
assess potential restructuring scenarios.  
 
Debt sustainability has become one of the most used and abused concepts in the recent 
discussion regarding international financial architecture. The truth of the matter is that 
nobody knows what it really means. Because debt sustainability has to do with the 
possibility of paying debts over the infinite future, it is obvious that reaching an 
agreement as to when this is possible and when it is not is a daunting task. This difficulty 
is compounded by the fact that governments will claim that they can make the payments, 
and that they can generate the needed primary surpluses even when history or common 
sense tends to suggest that such primary surpluses are not attainable. The issue is further 
complicated by the fact that what is attainable or not depends squarely on growth 
forecasts, and here governments, IFIs and the markets are certainly not bound to agree.  
 
Thus, we accept this truth openly: debt sustainability is an ill-defined concept. In what 
follows we provide, nevertheless, the most standard approximation to the issue of debt 
sustainability. To do so we start from the intertemporal budget constraint of the 
government. We show that if the debt is to be paid, current debt levels have to equal the 
present discounted value of future fiscal primary surpluses. With this fact, we implement 
two exercises. One is to find out, under the assumption that the economy is in steady 
state, what this primary surplus should be. Second, we allow for a transition phase. In this 
case we ask, given a possible long term primary surplus, what the maximum level of 
deficit allowed in the short run is. We also discuss the implications of exchange rate 
depreciations on sustainability. 
 
These exercises, of course, assume an extremely rigid setup that many would argue goes 
well beyond what is reasonable. However, unsatisfactory as it may seem, it is the best 





The basic equation describing the dynamics of debt accumulation is  
 
Dt+1 – Dt = it+1Dt – PSt+1 ,                (9) 
 
where PSt+1 is primary surplus of period t+1,  
Dt+1 is total end-of-period t+1 public debt stock (both domestic and external) 
Dt is total beginning-of-period t+1 public debt stock (both domestic and external) 
and it+1 is period t+1interest rate. 
 
If we write everything as a % of GDP we have: 
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where gt+1 is the GDP growth rate from period t to period t+1.  
 
This is a standard difference equation. Solving it forward and imposing the transversality 
condition that debt stock as a percentage of GDP in present value converges to zero we 
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i.e. the debt stock has to equal the present value of future primary surpluses. 
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 which can also be derived directly from (11).                                                                                                              
 
 
Our first pass at debt sustainability 
 
Our first exercise uses equation (15) and asks what primary surplus the government needs 
in order to make the debt sustainable. The results are presented in Table 7. The table   21
assumes an annual interest rate of 7% but different GDP growth rates and initial debt 
stocks. The table should be read in the following way: Given the expected rate of growth 
and the debt to GDP ratio, the table indicates the permanent primary surplus needed for 
that debt to be sustainable. For example Argentina today has a debt to GDP ratio of 
130%. If expected growth rate is 2%, it needs to obtain a 6.4% primary surplus to honor 
its debt. If expected growth rate is 5% the number falls to 2.5%. Obviously the higher the 
growth rate the smaller the required primary surplus, because the debt to GDP ratio 


























What primary surplus may be considered feasible or not feasible is debatable. In general, 
what is feasible usually is determined by a historical comparison that, to some extent, 
factors in political and economic constraints. For example, Argentina has had trouble 
delivering primary surpluses above 1% of GDP, given this, a primary surplus of 6.4% 
would be dubbed unsustainable. 
 
Of course, the above exercise is strongly influenced by the cost of debt. Reducing the 
interest rate on the debt improves sustainability. However several comments are 
necessary. The interest rate that has to be used for this exercise is the average interest 
rate, and therefore quite isolated from sharp spikes in the marginal rates caused  by 
liquidity crises. Tables 7.1 to 7.9 (in the appendix) and Figure 1 show how these results 
change once we move the rates from 4% to 12%.   
i 
1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0%
35% 2.1% 1.7% 1.4% 1.0% 0.7% 0.3%
40% 2.4% 2.0% 1.6% 1.2% 0.8% 0.4%
45% 2.7% 2.2% 1.7% 1.3% 0.9% 0.4%
50% 3.0% 2.5% 1.9% 1.4% 1.0% 0.5%
55% 3.3% 2.7% 2.1% 1.6% 1.0% 0.5%
60% 3.6% 2.9% 2.3% 1.7% 1.1% 0.6%
65% 3.9% 3.2% 2.5% 1.9% 1.2% 0.6%
70% 4.2% 3.4% 2.7% 2.0% 1.3% 0.7%
75% 4.5% 3.7% 2.9% 2.2% 1.4% 0.7%
80% 4.8% 3.9% 3.1% 2.3% 1.5% 0.8%
85% 5.0% 4.2% 3.3% 2.5% 1.6% 0.8%
90% 5.3% 4.4% 3.5% 2.6% 1.7% 0.8%
95% 5.6% 4.7% 3.7% 2.7% 1.8% 0.9%
100% 5.9% 4.9% 3.9% 2.9% 1.9% 0.9%
110% 6.5% 5.4% 4.3% 3.2% 2.1% 1.0%
120% 7.1% 5.9% 4.7% 3.5% 2.3% 1.1%
130% 7.7% 6.4% 5.0% 3.8% 2.5% 1.2%
140% 8.3% 6.9% 5.4% 4.0% 2.7% 1.3%
150% 8.9% 7.4% 5.8% 4.3% 2.9% 1.4%



















Necessary Permanent Primary Surplus
7.0%




























































































































































































































Figure 1   23
Does a devaluation affect debt ratios?
19 
  
Key to the analysis of debt sustainability is the denomination of debt in terms of tradables 









=           (16)   
 
where  e is the real exchange rate (defined as the price of tradables relative to non-
tradables), B is debt payable in terms of non-tradables, B* is debt payable in terms of 
tradables, Y is output of non-tradables, and Y* is output of tradables.  
 
Mismatches between debt and output composition can lead to substantial differences in 
valuation of the debt/GDP ratio following a real exchange rate depreciation. For example, 
consider the case in which all debt is foreign denominated  Y eB d / * = . This is the worst 
scenario in which a real exchange rate depreciation hits fully on sustainability. Another 
case that is particularly relevant is that in which  (B/eB*)/(Y/eY*) = 1, i. e., when the 
composition of debt and output is perfectly matched. When this condition holds, a 
depreciation has no effect on debt ratios. Table 8, taken from Calvo et. Al (2002) shows 
how countries ranked in terms of mismatch at the time of the Russian crisis. A value of 1 
indicates a perfect match, and value of zero would indicate the highest degree of 
mismatch. Clearly, the highest mismatch holds for Argentina. On the other side of the 
spectrum lies Chile, the best matched economy, with a value of 0.45. 
 
Table 8. Public Sector Debt Mismatch Measure (Table 6 in Calvo et al, 2002) 
  Argentina  Ecuador  Colombia  Brazil  Chile 
B/eB*  0.08  0.02  0.59  1.76  1.30 
Y/eY*  8.63  2.94  6.36  12.34  2.85 
(B/eB*)/(Y/eY*)  0.01  0.01  0.09  0.14  0.45 
 Source: Calvo et al,2002, estimates. Note: Values are given for 1998. 
 
Consider now the effects of a depreciation of the real exchange rate of 50 percent. 
Argentina and Ecuador, are the hardest hit. Just because of the relative price adjustment 
(holding the assumption that interest rates on public debt and GDP growth remain 
unchanged), Argentina’s debt/GDP ratio jumps from 36.5 percent of GDP to 50.8. Quite 
a different scenario plays out for Chile, where the debt revaluation effect is minimal: 
public sector debt as a share of GDP increases from 17.3 percent to 18.7 percent. The 
increase in the required primary surplus is shown in Table 9, also taken from Calvo et al 
(2002).  
 
                                               
19 This section follows closely Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2002).   24
Table 9. Fiscal Sustainability Under a 50% RER Depreciation 
  ARG  BRA  CHL  COL  ECU 
   Real Interest Rate  7.1  5.8  5.9  7.3  6.3 
   Real GDP Growth  3.8  2.0  7.5  3.6  2.6 
Observed Public Debt (% of GDP)  36.5  51.0  17.3  28.4  81.0 
           
i. Req. Primary Surplus (% of GDP)  1.2  1.9  n.a.  1.0  2.9 
           
With 50% depreciation           
Imputed Public Debt (% of GDP)  50.8  58.1  18.7  34.9  107.2 
           
ii. Req. Primary Surplus  1.6  2.2  n.a.  1.2  3.9 
           
NPV of ii – i (% of GDP)  14.3  7.1  n.a.  6.5  26.3 
Source: Calvo et al, 2002, estimates. Note: Values are given for 1998. n.a.: Not applicable given that the real interest 
rate is smaller than the grwth of GDP, so sustainability is not a concern.  
 
 
Sustainability in five real cases 
  
As a real world example of the previous simulation consider the required primary surplus 
for five countries that defaulted during the 90s. The required primary surplus is computed 
under the assumption of an annual interest rate of 10% and a GDP growth 4% per year 
and compared with actual primary surpluses in the aftermath of default.  
 
Noticeably, in spite of the devaluation that came with defaults increasing the burden on 
sustainability, with the exception of Pakistan, for which debt burdens were and remain 
unsustainable, all other countries have attained sustainability in the post default period. 
For all countries, fiscal adjustment accommodated the larger pressure.
20  
 
Table 10. Debt sustainability before and after default (all data as % of GDP) 
  Country indicators before and after default 
  Argentina  Ecuador  Pakistan  Russia  Ukraine 
  Before  After  Before  After  Before  After  Before  After  Before  After 
  (2000)  (2002)  (1998)  (2000)  (1998)  (2000)  (1997)  (2000)  (1999)  (2000) 
Government Debt  44.9  130.0  80.0  106.8  94.3  98.0  52.5  64.3  62.8  44.1 
Primary Balance 
(Actual data) 
0.4  ?  2.9  7.6  -0.3  1.2  -2.0  5.0  0.9  2.5 
Required Primary Balance 
for sustainability 
2.6  7.5  4.6  6.2  5.4  5.7  3.0  3.7  3.6  2.5 
Source: IMF and author’s computations. 
 
 
The striking adjustments in the primary surplus indicate another factor that has to be 
taken into account when considering the effect of a devaluation on debt sustainability: the 
strong increase in primary surpluses that follows a devaluation. The reason for this 
increase arises on the one hand from the fact that the revenue base of the government is at 
                                               
20 In the short run may very well represent an overshooting of its long run level   25
least partially dollarized. In fact the prices of the production of tradables (not exports) 
increase following the devaluation. On the other hand the main liability of government 
spending are wages and pensions that are quoted in domestic currency. Thus, as long as 
wages and pensions lag behind prices and the exchange rate, there is an automatic 
improvement in the primary surplus attained by the government. Thus what is relevant 
for determining if fiscal sustainability is compromised or not by a devaluation is to 
compare the effect of the devaluation on debt ratios on the one hand with the effect of 
devaluation on primary surpluses on the other. The elasticity of the primary surplus 
relative to devaluation will be higher, the higher the wage bill in government spending. 
The degree of pass through of the economy (which measures how much local wages will 
change upon a devaluation of the currency) is critical for evaluating the scope for a fiscal 
improving nominal devaluation. The recent experience of crisis countries, particularly in 
Latin America, as well as the result in Table 10, suggest that there is significant scope for 
this effect to be very significant.  
 
 
Using the framework to estimate transitional feasible deficits. 
 
If we assume in equation (11) that we arrive at the steady state primary surplus only after 
one period, then we can compute the primary surplus that can/should be obtained in the 
short run as: 
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( )
( )














.        (17) 
 
21Assuming different steady state  primary surpluses, we can calculate what primary 
surpluses a country has to run today to make its debt sustainable. The results are 
presented in Table 11.  
 
Table 11. Tolerable Temporary Primary Surplus 
                                               
21 The result can be extended to any period of undefined length by adjusting the interest rates to the new 
time set accordingly.    26
 
A negative value implies that the debt is sustainable and therefore that the government 
can actually run a deficit in the short run. The analyst should use this table in the 
following manner. He/she should decide what is a feasible “long run” primary surplus for 
the country. Once this is decided or agreed, an assumption on the growth rate should be 
made. Looking up the country, by choosing the row corresponding to the debt to GDP 
ratio of the country, the table will deliver the primary surplus/deficit that is compatible in 
the short run with debt sustainability. This value should be compared to actual primary 
surplus or deficit numbers.  
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Tool # 5. Estimating the haircut after default 
 




Senior secured  67.13 
Senior unsecured  46.53 
Senior subordinated  32.10 
Subordinated  26.44 
Junior subordinated  17.95 
Jarrow et al (1997) 
Average 1974-1991 
Weighted average  39.22 
Russian Eurobond  13.0 
Pre-GKO Default Subsample: 
07/23/1998 – 08/14/1998 
27.3 
Post-GKO Default Subsample: 
08/17/1998 – 12/14/1998 
10.3 
Argentina  49.6 
Pre-GKO Default Subsample: 
07/23/1998 – 08/14/1998 
51.2 
Merrick (1999) 
Post-GKO Default Subsample: 
08/17/1998 – 12/14/1998 
49.3 
Argentina: 12/10/01 - 12/20/01  21.7 
Sosa Navarro (2002) 
Argentina Post-Default: 12/21/01  20.8 
 
An important practical question when trying to estimate default probabilities relates to 
what recovery value to use. One possibility is to use data from the US corporate bond 
market, where there is enough evidence on the recovery values obtained from past 
defaults. Table 12 shows the historical recovery rates included in Jarrow  et al (1997), 
taken from Moody’s Special Report (1992). As can be seen, recovery rates increase with 
the seniority of the debt. The average recovery rate is 39% for all US corporates.  
 
Merrick (1999) using the additional information provided by looking at several bonds 
with cross default clauses (and thus the same default probability) provides an independent 
estimator for the default probability and recovery values. He finds that for the Russian 
default, recovery values were substantially lower than those of US corporates, while  
Argentina’s recovery values during the 1998 Russian crisis remained high and similar to 
a senior unsecured US corporate. Sosa Navarro (2002), using a similar framework, 
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Table 7 of Tool # 4 can also be used to provide some idea as to what sort of restructuring 
may be necessary to make the debt sustainable. To illustrate the workings of the exercise 
consider the case of Argentina. Assuming a debt to GDP ratio of 130%, a growth rate of 
2% and an average interest rate of 7%, the table indicates that the country needs  a 
primary surplus of 6.4% to pay its debt. Consider now that we believe that the maximum 
primary surplus attainable is 2% of GDP, an assumption made by the analyst based on an 
informed guess which takes into account the political willingness and feasibility of 
delivering such a result. In order to figure out the degree of necessary restructuring we 
have to move up the column to find the debt to GDP ratio for which a 2% primary surplus 
is enough to ensure sustainability. Interpolating the figures in the table we find the 
number to be about 40%, in other words, under those assumptions, only a debt of 40% of 
GDP is sustainable. Given that the debt currently stands at 130% of GDP, the debt has to 
be reduced to 30.8% (40/130) of its original level delivering a haircut of about 69.2%.  
 
More generally, in the set of Tables 7.1 to 7.9 the exercise is always the same. Assuming 
a certain growth rate and expected cost of capital in the post default scenario we look at 
“feasible” or “targeted” primary surpluses. Once this is determined we read of the graph 
or the table the corresponding level of the debt to GDP ratio. The comparison between 




                                               
22 In the aftermath of a default the current debt to GDP ratio may be influenced by an overshooting of the 
exchange rate. In that case the computations should more safely be done with an equilibrium level for the 
real exchange rate.    29
Tool # 6. Estimating the Financial Impact of Default 
 
Objective: to have an assessment of the financial costs or benefits of the default 
decision.  
 
Default entails two potential effects: on financial costs and potentially worse growth 
performance. This and the next tool provide the instruments to measure these two effects.  
 
The default decision will most likely change the future costs of indebtedness. However, 
there are two squarely different views on this issue. On the one hand, there are those that 
argue that defaulting reduces financing costs because by bringing the country closer to 
sustainability and reducing the debt ratios, it allows the country to entice future creditors 
to offer financing at a lower cost. On the other hand, others argue that the reputational 
costs of the decision to default increases the financial cost looking forward, thus making 
future debt issues more costly, as new investors fear the recurrence of the event. In 
addition to all this, the haircut reduces financing costs directly from the lower level of 
debt.  
 
The empirical model discussed in the Tool # 1 helps us bring some structure to discussing 
this problem for the marginal cost of debt
23. In that model, spreads were associated to 
debt levels as well as to previous default experiences. According to that model each 
percentage point reduction in the debt to GDP level implied a reduction of 7 basis points 
in spreads. On the other hand, the same model estimated the reputational cost to be equal 
to 165 basis points as identified by the restructuring dummy in the model. As a 
restructuring reduces the total amount of debt, the net effect is ambiguous.  
 
In short, the financial impact of a restructuring, can be computed as 
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.   (18) 
 
 
The interpretation of the formula is very simple. It just compares the stream of payments 
before and after default. Using rather strictly the model in Tool # 1, we can compare the 
before and after restructuring cost of interest by the using the formula:  
 
rafter= rbefore + 165 bps – 7 x (percentage debt reduction in percentage of GDP).      (19) 
 
Table 13 shows our estimates for (18) using (19). The table is computed for several 
restructuring scenarios and several maturity assumptions for the debt. If 50% of the debt 
has to be refinanced each year, debt structure is shorter and the change in costs kicks in 
quickly, In the case that only 12.5 has to be refinanced each year the costs change more 
slowly.  
 
                                               




The numbers in Table 13 combine three effects. First, it is assumed that a debt 
restructuring implies a higher cost for more debt (in our case of 165 bps.) due to 
reputational effects. This higher rate applies to new issues and therefore will be more 
significant for shorter maturity debt. Second, this number may be compensated by a 
reduction of spreads due to the decline in debt ratios. As each percentage point reduction 
in debt to GDP levels leads to 7 basis points of spread declines we need a debt reduction 
of over 23% to compensate the reputational effect of the default on interest cost. Thus, 
small restructurings increase the financial cost, while large restructurings reduce the 
financial effort required to pay the debt. The third channel is the reduction in debt levels 
itself, which reduces the debt cost directly. All values are computed a s PDV at the 
arbitrary rate of 10% and expressed as percentages of GDP.  
 
The exercise is certainly mechanical but helps to illustrate the three mechanics by which 




0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
Debt roll-over Debt roll-over Debt roll-over Debt roll-over Debt roll-over
50% 25% 12.5% 50% 25% 12.5% 50% 25% 12.5% 50% 25% 12.5% 50% 25% 12.5%
10% 1.8% 1.6% 1.4% -0.1% -0.2% -0.3% -1.8% -1.8% -1.8% -3.3% -3.3% -3.3% -4.7% -4.7% -4.6%
15% 2.6% 2.4% 2.1% -0.1% -0.2% -0.4% -2.7% -2.7% -2.7% -5.0% -5.0% -4.9% -7.1% -7.0% -6.9%
20% 3.5% 3.2% 2.8% -0.2% -0.3% -0.6% -3.6% -3.6% -3.7% -6.7% -6.6% -6.5% -9.5% -9.4% -9.2%
25% 4.4% 4.0% 3.5% -0.2% -0.4% -0.7% -4.5% -4.5% -4.6% -8.3% -8.3% -8.2% -11.8% -11.7% -11.4%
30% 5.3% 4.9% 4.1% -0.3% -0.5% -0.9% -5.4% -5.4% -5.5% -10.0% -9.9% -9.8% -14.2% -14.0% -13.7%
35% 6.2% 5.7% 4.8% -0.3% -0.6% -1.0% -6.3% -6.3% -6.4% -11.7% -11.6% -11.4% -16.6% -16.4% -16.0%
40% 7.0% 6.5% 5.5% -0.4% -0.6% -1.1% -7.1% -7.2% -7.3% -13.3% -13.2% -13.1% -18.9% -18.7% -18.3%
45% 7.9% 7.3% 6.2% -0.4% -0.7% -1.3% -8.0% -8.1% -8.2% -15.0% -14.9% -14.7% -21.3% -21.0% -20.6%
50% 8.8% 8.1% 6.9% -0.4% -0.8% -1.4% -8.9% -9.0% -9.2% -16.7% -16.5% -16.3% -23.7% -23.4% -22.9%
55% 9.7% 8.9% 7.6% -0.5% -0.9% -1.6% -9.8% -9.9% -10.1% -18.3% -18.2% -18.0% -26.0% -25.7% -25.2%
60% 10.5% 9.7% 8.3% -0.5% -1.0% -1.7% -10.7% -10.8% -11.0% -20.0% -19.9% -19.6% -28.4% -28.1% -27.5%
65% 11.4% 10.5% 9.0% -0.6% -1.0% -1.8% -11.6% -11.7% -11.9% -21.7% -21.5% -21.2% -30.8% -30.4% -29.8%
70% 12.3% 11.3% 9.7% -0.6% -1.1% -2.0% -12.5% -12.6% -12.8% -23.3% -23.2% -22.8% -33.1% -32.7% -32.0%
75% 13.2% 12.1% 10.4% -0.7% -1.2% -2.1% -13.4% -13.5% -13.7% -25.0% -24.8% -24.5% -35.5% -35.1% -34.3%
80% 14.1% 12.9% 11.1% -0.7% -1.3% -2.3% -14.3% -14.4% -14.7% -26.7% -26.5% -26.1% -37.9% -37.4% -36.6%
85% 14.9% 13.8% 11.8% -0.8% -1.4% -2.4% -15.2% -15.3% -15.6% -28.4% -28.1% -27.7% -40.2% -39.8% -38.9%
90% 15.8% 14.6% 12.4% -0.8% -1.5% -2.6% -16.1% -16.2% -16.5% -30.0% -29.8% -29.4% -42.6% -42.1% -41.2%
95% 16.7% 15.4% 13.1% -0.8% -1.5% -2.7% -17.0% -17.1% -17.4% -31.7% -31.4% -31.0% -45.0% -44.4% -43.5%
100% 17.6% 16.2% 13.8% -0.9% -1.6% -2.8% -17.9% -18.0% -18.3% -33.4% -33.1% -32.6% -47.4% -46.8% -45.8%
110% 19.3% 17.8% 15.2% -1.0% -1.8% -3.1% -19.7% -19.8% -20.2% -36.7% -36.4% -35.9% -52.1% -51.4% -50.4%
120% 21.1% 19.4% 16.6% -1.1% -1.9% -3.4% -21.4% -21.6% -22.0% -40.0% -39.7% -39.2% -56.8% -56.1% -54.9%
130% 22.8% 21.0% 18.0% -1.2% -2.1% -3.7% -23.2% -23.4% -23.8% -43.4% -43.0% -42.4% -61.6% -60.8% -59.5%
140% 24.6% 22.7% 19.4% -1.2% -2.3% -4.0% -25.0% -25.3% -25.7% -46.7% -46.3% -45.7% -66.3% -65.5% -64.1%



















Tool # 7. Assessing the Output Effects.  
 
Objective: To estimate the real economy implications of defaults. 
 
Measuring the output implications of default decisions is difficult. Default decisions 
usually do not come isolated from a general mismanagement of the economy. Thus to 
assess the contributing role of defaults one should be able to identify the differential 
impact of those other factors relative to that of the default decision itself. That is a 
daunting task. One possibility to approximate an answer to this question is to consider a 
standard cross-country growth regression format. However, to the usual growth literature 
specification we add the default decision.  
 
Comprehensive data since 1974 can be gathered for close to 100 countries. We condition 
growth performance by population (POP), the ratio of investment to GDP (INVGDP), the 
rate of growth of population (POPWDI), the initial level of GDP (GDPPC74), the growth 
of government consumption (GOV1), the initial level of education (SECB), an indicator 
of civil unrest (CIVIL), the change in terms of trade (DTIWDI), a measure of openness 
(OPENNESS) and yearly dummies.
24 To that specification we add DEF, a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the country ever defaulted and 0 otherwise or DEFPLUS, 
a variable that counts the number of times a country defaulted. DEFPLUS takes the value 
1 if the country defaulted in the 80s or in the 90s, 2 if the country defaulted in the 80s 
and in the 90s and 0 if the country never defaulted.  
 
                                               
24 See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) for a description of why these are the variables to include. See 
footnoe 25 for data sources.   32
Table 14. Cross-section Growth Regressions (Average 1974-1999) 
  (I)  (II)  (I)  (II) 







POPAV  0.003*  0.003*  0.003*  0.003* 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
INVGDPAV  7.110*  7.139*  6.378  6.395 
  (4.194)  (4.193)  (4.303)  (4.302) 
POPWDIAV  -0.166  -0.156  -0.133  -0.119 
  (0.154)  (0.157)  (0.216)  (0.220) 
GDPPC74AV  -0.485***  -0.489***  -0.439***  -0.443*** 
  (0.095)  (0.095)  (0.112)  (0.111) 
GOV1AV  -1.283  -1.322  3.302**  3.280** 
  (1.168)  (1.156)  (1.558)  (1.550) 
SECBAV  0.898  0.920  1.001  1.025 
  (1.028)  (1.028)  (1.006)  (1.006) 
CIVILAV  -0.538***  -0.547***  -0.484***  -0.493*** 
  (0.180)  (0.182)  (0.175)  (0.176) 
DTIWDIAV  1.630***  1.636***  1.354***  1.352*** 
  (0.396)  (0.394)  (0.390)  (0.390) 
OPENNESSAV  1.141*  1.117*  1.186*  1.167 
  (0.630)  (0.633)  (0.710)  (0.715) 
INFAV      -2.324  -2.320 
      (1.435)  (1.425) 
VOLINFAV      -0.002***  -0.002*** 
      (0.001)  (0.001) 
BANK2AV      -0.479  -0.447 
      (1.008)  (1.013) 
DEF  -0.645*    -0.664*   
  (0.358)    (0.337)   
DEFPLUS    -0.604*    -0.635** 
    (0.322)    (0.303) 
Observations  99  99  98  98 
R-squared  0.62  0.62  0.66  0.67 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 
The results are fully consistent with traditional growth theory and indicate, in Table 14, a 
very significant impact of defaults on growth. Specifically the results indicate that 
countries that defaulted grow about 0.6% less than those that do not. In order to 
disentangle the independent role of macroeconomic instability and of the default decision 
we introduce average inflation (INFAV), its volatility (VOLINFAV) and a banking crisis 
“average” (BANK2AV) as independent variables in the previous specification all of 
which may be correlated with the default decision. Yet, the result remains virtually 
unchanged. For the period 74 to 99 this implies that defaulters lag no defaulters by about 
14%. If this number were true, this would represent a significant cost.  
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This estimation has two main drawbacks. First, the question may arise as to what extent 
the default c oefficient is capturing the effect of other omitted variables, which are 
correlated to the default decision. If default comes together with a weak political system, 
other type of conflicts, weak institutions, etc. the default dummy may be capturing the 
effect of these other factors. Second, the question may arise as to whether the true effect 
of default may not be captured by other variables (for example the investment variable). 
While multicollinearity is usually not a problem in the interpretation of regression 
coefficients, we need to ensure that the investment variable is not endogenous to growth 
performance, which in turn depends on the default variable.  
 
We address these two concerns in turn. First we run a similar specification to that above 
but using annual data with fixed effects. The fixed effect should factor out all the 
country’s idiosyncrasies. As the default dummy is swamped in the fixed effect our default 
variable is a dummy pivoting around the default experience of the early 80s. DEFPLUS1 
is  a variable that takes the value of 1 in the year of default and the following year. 
DEFPLUS5 incorporates the following 5 years.     34




(I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V) 
  Baseline w / 
def80plus1 
Baseline w / 
def80plus5 
Inflation and 
Banking w / 
def80plus1 
Inflation and 
Banking w / 
def80plus5 
Baseline w / 
def90 
POP  0.002  0.002  0.003  0.003  0.004 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
INVGDP  12.475***  11.993***  10.583***  10.101***  10.243*** 
  (2.080)  (2.090)  (2.117)  (2.124)  (2.122) 
POPWDI  0.803***  0.801***  -0.116  -0.121  -0.132 
  (0.123)  (0.123)  (0.182)  (0.182)  (0.182) 
GOV1  -1.082***  -1.016***  1.309***  1.349***  1.393*** 
  (0.314)  (0.315)  (0.434)  (0.435)  (0.434) 
CIVIL  -0.089  -0.094  0.068  0.065  0.046 
  (0.123)  (0.124)  (0.126)  (0.127)  (0.126) 
DTIWDI  0.662***  0.667***  0.600***  0.604***  0.607*** 
  (0.055)  (0.055)  (0.054)  (0.054)  (0.054) 
OPENNESS  2.017  2.215  2.498  2.737*  3.045* 
  (1.637)  (1.646)  (1.611)  (1.617)  (1.610) 
DEF80PLUS1  -2.105***    -1.852***     
  (0.532)    (0.526)     
DEF80PLUS5    -0.833**    -0.635*   
    (0.389)    (0.383)   
DEF90          -3.370 
          (3.063) 
INF      -2.721***  -2.706***  -2.782*** 
      (0.489)  (0.492)  (0.490) 
VOLINF      -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
      (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
BANK2      -1.561***  -1.599***  -1.601*** 
      (0.294)  (0.294)  (0.295) 
CONSTANT  -3.650***  -3.624***  -1.811**  -1.805**  -1.927** 
  (0.819)  (0.826)  (0.854)  (0.858)  (0.856) 
Observations  2240  2240  2087  2087  2087 
Number of 
code 
99  99  98  98  98 
R-squared  0.12  0.12  0.12  0.12  0.12 
Standard errors in parentheses           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%           
 
The dummy also takes a value of one for the year of the default and the year before. 
These events may not be subject to much endogeneity problems as debt defaults in the 
80s were to a great extent the result of exogenous liquidity shocks propagating after the 
Mexican default. As can be seen in Table 15 these dummies have significant negative 
coefficients indicating that the default in the 80s had significant and long lasting growth 
costs (thus the reference to this period as the lost decade). 
                                               
25 DGDPPC is the rate of growth of Real per Capita GDP (Source: World Economic Outlook (WEO)); INVGDP is the 
investment to GDP Ratio (Source: IMF’s International Financial Statistics); POPWDI is the population growth (annual 
%) (SP.POP.GROW) (Source: World Development Indicators (WDI)); GDPPC74 is the initial per capita GDP (average 
over 1970-1973) (Source: WEO); GOV1 is the growth of government consumption (lagged one period) (Source: IMF); 
SECB is the total gross enrollment ratio for secondary education (Source: Barro (1991)); CIVIL is the index of civil 
liberties (index measured on a 1 to 7 scale; 1=highest degree of freedom) (Source: Freedom in the World - Annual 
survey of freedom country ratings); DTIWDI is the  Change in terms of trade  - exports as a capacity to import 
(constant LCU) (NY.EXP.CAPM.KN) (Source: WDI); OPENNESS is the ratio of (export + import)/2 to GDP (Source: 
IMF). Table 14 uses the corresponding variables averaged over the dates for which country data is available. 
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While Table 15 appears to indicate a negative impact of the default decision, it is true that 
following the default macroeconomic instability increases dramatically. This 
macroeconomic instability usually is the result of the default decision, the lack of 
alternative financing or both. However, in order to disentangle the independent role of 
macroeconomic instability and of the default decision we introduce the inflation (INF) 
and its volatility (VOLINF) and a banking crisis dummy (BANK2) as independent 
variables in the previous specification. As before, once this is done in Table 15 the results 
remain robust indicating that default decisions do have an independent negative effect.  
 
In the short run all these variables have a negative effect on output performance. 
However the default variable remains significant. The analysis warrants the conclusion 
that defaults that trigger banking crises and macroeconomic instability lead to far worse 
outcomes than those that do not.  
 
Column (v) introduces a dummy for the default in the 90s (DEF90). The results show no 
significant effect. One could be tempted to infer that this implies that these defaults had 
no growth implications. However, this would be rushing to an unwarranted conclusion. 
Due to lack of information on other variables the 90s default dummy includes very few 
observations and, given how recent the events are, cannot span fully the effects of the 
default decision. Unfortunately, no improvement can be made at this stage in terms of 
econometric evaluation; thus, we need a more informal, look at the data. 
 
Finally, to address the concern regarding the endogeneity of some of the variables 
correlated to the default decision, such as investment, we present in Table 16 the same 
results but instrumenting the investment variable with its own value lagged (lagged one 
period and twice). While the investment variable becomes insignificant the results 
regarding the default variables remain almost unchanged. 
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Table 16. Fixed effect Growth Regressions w/investment instrumented (1974-1999) 
FIXED EFFECTS  (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V) 
  Baseline w / 
def80plus1 
Baseline w /  
def80plus5 
Inflation and 
Banking w / 
def80plus1 
Inflation and 
Banking w / 
def80plus5 
Baseline w / 
def90 
 
POP  0.004  0.005  0.006  0.006  0.007 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
INVGDP  -2.558  -3.352  -4.086  -4.889  -4.675 
  (3.049)  (3.068)  (3.001)  (3.017)  (3.011) 
POPWDI  0.925***  0.924***  0.031  0.028  0.013 
  (0.128)  (0.128)  (0.193)  (0.193)  (0.193) 
GOV1  -0.729**  -0.655*  1.789***  1.819***  1.861*** 
  (0.337)  (0.337)  (0.458)  (0.460)  (0.459) 
CIVIL  -0.059  -0.061  0.125  0.125  0.105 
  (0.132)  (0.133)  (0.135)  (0.136)  (0.135) 
DTIWDI  0.661***  0.662***  0.602***  0.603***  0.608*** 
  (0.061)  (0.062)  (0.060)  (0.061)  (0.060) 
OPENNESS  5.655***  5.879***  5.389***  5.686***  5.965*** 
  (1.848)  (1.852)  (1.800)  (1.803)  (1.798) 
DEF80PLUS1  -1.743***    -1.523***     
  (0.554)    (0.547)     
DEF80PLUS5    -0.826**    -0.606   
    (0.413)    (0.406)   
DEF90          -3.867 
          (3.116) 
INF      -2.655***  -2.632***  -2.722*** 
      (0.527)  (0.532)  (0.528) 
VOLINF      -0.001**  -0.001**  -0.001** 
      (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
BANK2      -1.774***  -1.802***  -1.795*** 
      (0.305)  (0.305)  (0.306) 
Constant  -2.106**  -2.022**  -0.211  -0.154  -0.278 
  (0.911)  (0.920)  (0.951)  (0.957)  (0.953) 
Observations  2064  2064  1932  1932  1932 
Number of code  99  99  98  98  98 
Standard errors in parentheses           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
 
For the analyst the results just provide a sketch as to how to estimate the output effects. 
The length and deepness of the fall in output will depend, to a great extent, on the 
assessment of whether a financial crisis will ensue or not. The experience of the 80s tends 
to suggest an accumulated 4% drop in output over the immediately following four years.    37
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V. Conclusions: Lessons from Recent Defaults 
 
This chapter has discussed several tools that allow us to understand some of the changes 
that occur, during, prior or after a default decision. However, the analysis cannot be this 
mechanical.  
 
While recent experiences have exhibited a fairly common pattern the lessons should be 
enriched by the analyst judgment. For example, unsustainable fixed exchange rate 
regimes, combined with weak fiscal problems have been important determinants of recent 
experiences and their correction an important factor in the turnaround. However, this 
should not be interpreted as implying that a country with a floating rate would be able to 
avoid a default if its fiscal policies are inconsistent.
26 Yet a country with fixed rates may 
be more vulnerable, both due to balance sheet effects and increased fragility of the 
financial sector. As of late, one should add the fact that the Fund and other multilaterals 
have been totally unwilling to support fixed exchange rate regimes. All these factors feed 
into the instability of the situation, acting as a catalyst for the crisis. In any case, it is the 
combination of fiscal unsustainability and exposed financial sectors what combines to 
increase the probability of a crisis.  
 
Needless to say, the best alternative to avoid the mess associated to defaults is for 
sensible macroeconomic policies: reasonable budgets, relatively low money printing and 
inflation, and the pursuing of a  sensible growth agenda by pursuing deregulation, 
openness, reasonable tax systems and strong defense of property rights. However, for 
countries which are relatively exposed to default risk, and which do not have the internal 
consensus to steer course into safer waters, some second best solutions may be tried.  
 
A weak point in the link is the banking sector. Having strong prudential regulation is a 
good initial step but, as proven by the Argentine experience, it is not enough to insure 
stability. The problem with the financial sector is that, either because of internal moral 
hazard (banks expect to be bailed out) or because they are forced to, the domestic 
financial sector ends with substantial long positions in the defaulting countries´ debt 
instruments. Once the government defaults on these instruments, the financial sector is 
bankrupt. The anticipation of this event triggers a financial crisis prior to the default. 
Compounded with the balance sheet effects of the devaluation the impact is extremely 
negative.  
 
One solution to this problem is to limit bank’s bond holdings. While in most countries 
government debt is considered among the safest and liquid of assets,
27 this is not the case 
for near default economies. In those cases it may be a sensible decision to limit bank 
exposure to default risk as default becomes more imminent. The implementation of this, 
however, is not trivial if it forces banks to sell its bond holdings in the running up to a 
default crisis. A clean solution would be to prohibit banks from holding government debt. 
                                               
26 Neither does this imply that a country with a floating rate cannot suffer a liquidity crunch or a run on its 
bond market. 
27 In fact, new Basle rules have started to take this into account, see Castro (2002).   39
Of course banks could sell government debt to their clients, but they could not hold it 
themselves. Thus, default risk would be taken fully by the households or private 
investors. This is certainly a massive change in banking regulation proposals, and could 
be restricted to countries without investment grade on their debt holdings.  
 
More involved are the proposals to reduce the balance sheet problem of the financial 
sector.  Countries with the original sin à la Hausmann will likely develop a financial 
sector that is strongly dollarized and governments will also be forced to issue debt in 
foreign currency, both to gain credibility and reduce costs. Both factors contribute, to 
increasing the costs of a devaluation. One alternative is to move towards dollarization as 
in Ecuador.
28 However, if fiscal accounts remain unbalanced, dollarization risks the 
monetary anarchy currently in Argentina.
29 In such a context dollarization may be of 
limited use. Alternatively financial restrictions as in Brazil that do not allow for a 
dollarized financial sector or as in Chile where an indexed financial unit of account is 
used may become more prevalent in years to come. While these measures may induce 
some capital flight if savers insist in holding dollar denominated assets, they may render 
a more stable financial sector than what is obtained by imposing capital controls at the 
moment in which the crisis emerges, a pervasive phenomenon in the experiences 
described in this paper. 
 
The analyst interested in anticipating and evaluating debt problems will have to assess all 
these second best solutions as a way of assessing the risks of default. And then that is just 
a starter, the real difficulties lie when we have to factor in political considerations. 
 
 
                                               
28 See Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) for a comprehensive discussion of dollarization.  
29 Once debt financing was not available any longer, provinces in Argentina started printing their own 








Implicit probability of default
i
Recovery Value (as a % of principal)
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
50 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 1.6% 2.4% 4.8%
100 1.1% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 2.0% 2.4% 3.2% 4.8% 9.1%
150 1.6% 1.8% 2.1% 2.4% 2.9% 3.6% 4.8% 7.0% 13.0%
200 2.2% 2.4% 2.8% 3.2% 3.8% 4.8% 6.3% 9.1% 16.7%
250 2.7% 3.0% 3.4% 4.0% 4.8% 5.9% 7.7% 11.1% 20.0%
300 3.2% 3.6% 4.1% 4.8% 5.7% 7.0% 9.1% 13.0% 23.1%
350 3.7% 4.2% 4.8% 5.5% 6.5% 8.0% 10.4% 14.9% 25.9%
400 4.3% 4.8% 5.4% 6.3% 7.4% 9.1% 11.8% 16.7% 28.6%
450 4.8% 5.3% 6.0% 7.0% 8.3% 10.1% 13.0% 18.4% 31.0%
500 5.3% 5.9% 6.7% 7.7% 9.1% 11.1% 14.3% 20.0% 33.3%
550 5.8% 6.4% 7.3% 8.4% 9.9% 12.1% 15.5% 21.6% 35.5%
600 6.3% 7.0% 7.9% 9.1% 10.7% 13.0% 16.7% 23.1% 37.5%
650 6.7% 7.5% 8.5% 9.8% 11.5% 14.0% 17.8% 24.5% 39.4%
700 7.2% 8.0% 9.1% 10.4% 12.3% 14.9% 18.9% 25.9% 41.2%
750 7.7% 8.6% 9.7% 11.1% 13.0% 15.8% 20.0% 27.3% 42.9%
800 8.2% 9.1% 10.3% 11.8% 13.8% 16.7% 21.1% 28.6% 44.4%
850 8.6% 9.6% 10.8% 12.4% 14.5% 17.5% 22.1% 29.8% 45.9%
900 9.1% 10.1% 11.4% 13.0% 15.3% 18.4% 23.1% 31.0% 47.4%
950 9.5% 10.6% 11.9% 13.7% 16.0% 19.2% 24.1% 32.2% 48.7%
1000 10.0% 11.1% 12.5% 14.3% 16.7% 20.0% 25.0% 33.3% 50.0%
1050 10.4% 11.6% 13.0% 14.9% 17.4% 20.8% 25.9% 34.4% 51.2%
1100 10.9% 12.1% 13.6% 15.5% 18.0% 21.6% 26.8% 35.5% 52.4%
1150 11.3% 12.6% 14.1% 16.1% 18.7% 22.3% 27.7% 36.5% 53.5%
1200 11.8% 13.0% 14.6% 16.7% 19.4% 23.1% 28.6% 37.5% 54.5%
1250 12.2% 13.5% 15.2% 17.2% 20.0% 23.8% 29.4% 38.5% 55.6%
1300 12.6% 14.0% 15.7% 17.8% 20.6% 24.5% 30.2% 39.4% 56.5%
1350 13.0% 14.4% 16.2% 18.4% 21.3% 25.2% 31.0% 40.3% 57.4%
1400 13.5% 14.9% 16.7% 18.9% 21.9% 25.9% 31.8% 41.2% 58.3%
1450 13.9% 15.3% 17.2% 19.5% 22.5% 26.6% 32.6% 42.0% 59.2%
1500 14.3% 15.8% 17.6% 20.0% 23.1% 27.3% 33.3% 42.9% 60.0%
1550 14.7% 16.2% 18.1% 20.5% 23.7% 27.9% 34.1% 43.7% 60.8%
1600 15.1% 16.7% 18.6% 21.1% 24.2% 28.6% 34.8% 44.4% 61.5%
1650 15.5% 17.1% 19.1% 21.6% 24.8% 29.2% 35.5% 45.2% 62.3%
1700 15.9% 17.5% 19.5% 22.1% 25.4% 29.8% 36.2% 45.9% 63.0%
1750 16.3% 17.9% 20.0% 22.6% 25.9% 30.4% 36.8% 46.7% 63.6%
1800 16.7% 18.4% 20.5% 23.1% 26.5% 31.0% 37.5% 47.4% 64.3%
1850 17.1% 18.8% 20.9% 23.6% 27.0% 31.6% 38.1% 48.1% 64.9%
1900 17.4% 19.2% 21.3% 24.1% 27.5% 32.2% 38.8% 48.7% 65.5%
1950 17.8% 19.6% 21.8% 24.5% 28.1% 32.8% 39.4% 49.4% 66.1%
2000 18.2% 20.0% 22.2% 25.0% 28.6% 33.3% 40.0% 50.0% 66.7%
2500 21.7% 23.8% 26.3% 29.4% 33.3% 38.5% 45.5% 55.6% 71.4%
3000 25.0% 27.3% 30.0% 33.3% 37.5% 42.9% 50.0% 60.0% 75.0%
3500 28.0% 30.4% 33.3% 36.8% 41.2% 46.7% 53.8% 63.6% 77.8%
4000 30.8% 33.3% 36.4% 40.0% 44.4% 50.0% 57.1% 66.7% 80.0%
4500 33.3% 36.0% 39.1% 42.9% 47.4% 52.9% 60.0% 69.2% 81.8%
5000 35.7% 38.5% 41.7% 45.5% 50.0% 55.6% 62.5% 71.4% 83.3%
5500 37.9% 40.7% 44.0% 47.8% 52.4% 57.9% 64.7% 73.3% 84.6%































Implicit probability of default
i
Recovery Value (as a % of principal)
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
50 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 1.6% 2.3% 4.4%
100 1.1% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.9% 2.4% 3.2% 4.6% 8.4%
150 1.6% 1.8% 2.1% 2.4% 2.9% 3.6% 4.7% 6.7% 12.1%
200 2.2% 2.4% 2.8% 3.2% 3.8% 4.7% 6.1% 8.8% 15.5%
250 2.7% 3.0% 3.4% 4.0% 4.7% 5.8% 7.5% 10.7% 18.7%
300 3.2% 3.6% 4.1% 4.7% 5.6% 6.9% 8.9% 12.6% 21.6%
350 3.7% 4.2% 4.7% 5.5% 6.5% 7.9% 10.2% 14.4% 24.3%
400 4.3% 4.8% 5.4% 6.2% 7.3% 9.0% 11.5% 16.1% 26.9%
450 4.8% 5.3% 6.0% 6.9% 8.2% 10.0% 12.8% 17.8% 29.2%
500 5.3% 5.9% 6.6% 7.6% 9.0% 11.0% 14.0% 19.4% 31.5%
550 5.8% 6.4% 7.3% 8.3% 9.8% 11.9% 15.2% 20.9% 33.6%
600 6.2% 7.0% 7.9% 9.0% 10.6% 12.9% 16.4% 22.4% 35.5%
650 6.7% 7.5% 8.5% 9.7% 11.4% 13.8% 17.5% 23.8% 37.4%
700 7.2% 8.0% 9.1% 10.4% 12.2% 14.7% 18.6% 25.2% 39.1%
750 7.7% 8.6% 9.6% 11.0% 12.9% 15.6% 19.6% 26.5% 40.8%
800 8.2% 9.1% 10.2% 11.7% 13.7% 16.5% 20.7% 27.8% 42.3%
850 8.6% 9.6% 10.8% 12.3% 14.4% 17.3% 21.7% 29.0% 43.8%
900 9.1% 10.1% 11.3% 13.0% 15.1% 18.1% 22.7% 30.2% 45.2%
950 9.5% 10.6% 11.9% 13.6% 15.8% 19.0% 23.6% 31.4% 46.6%
1000 10.0% 11.1% 12.5% 14.2% 16.5% 19.8% 24.6% 32.5% 47.9%
1050 10.4% 11.6% 13.0% 14.8% 17.2% 20.6% 25.5% 33.6% 49.1%
1100 10.9% 12.1% 13.5% 15.4% 17.9% 21.3% 26.4% 34.6% 50.2%
1150 11.3% 12.5% 14.1% 16.0% 18.5% 22.1% 27.3% 35.6% 51.4%
1200 11.8% 13.0% 14.6% 16.6% 19.2% 22.8% 28.1% 36.6% 52.4%
1250 12.2% 13.5% 15.1% 17.1% 19.8% 23.5% 28.9% 37.5% 53.4%
1300 12.6% 13.9% 15.6% 17.7% 20.5% 24.3% 29.8% 38.5% 54.4%
1350 13.0% 14.4% 16.1% 18.3% 21.1% 25.0% 30.5% 39.4% 55.3%
1400 13.4% 14.9% 16.6% 18.8% 21.7% 25.6% 31.3% 40.2% 56.2%
1450 13.9% 15.3% 17.1% 19.4% 22.3% 26.3% 32.1% 41.1% 57.1%
1500 14.3% 15.8% 17.6% 19.9% 22.9% 27.0% 32.8% 41.9% 57.9%
1550 14.7% 16.2% 18.1% 20.4% 23.5% 27.6% 33.6% 42.7% 58.7%
1600 15.1% 16.6% 18.5% 20.9% 24.1% 28.3% 34.3% 43.5% 59.5%
1650 15.5% 17.1% 19.0% 21.5% 24.6% 28.9% 35.0% 44.2% 60.2%
1700 15.9% 17.5% 19.5% 22.0% 25.2% 29.5% 35.6% 45.0% 61.0%
1750 16.3% 17.9% 19.9% 22.5% 25.7% 30.1% 36.3% 45.7% 61.6%
1800 16.7% 18.3% 20.4% 23.0% 26.3% 30.7% 37.0% 46.4% 62.3%
1850 17.0% 18.7% 20.8% 23.4% 26.8% 31.3% 37.6% 47.1% 62.9%
1900 17.4% 19.2% 21.3% 23.9% 27.3% 31.9% 38.2% 47.7% 63.6%
1950 17.8% 19.6% 21.7% 24.4% 27.9% 32.4% 38.8% 48.4% 64.2%
2000 18.2% 20.0% 22.1% 24.9% 28.4% 33.0% 39.5% 49.0% 64.7%
2500 21.7% 23.8% 26.2% 29.3% 33.1% 38.1% 44.9% 54.6% 69.7%
3000 25.0% 27.2% 29.9% 33.2% 37.3% 42.5% 49.4% 59.1% 73.4%
3500 28.0% 30.4% 33.2% 36.7% 40.9% 46.3% 53.3% 62.7% 76.3%
4000 30.7% 33.3% 36.3% 39.8% 44.2% 49.6% 56.6% 65.8% 78.6%
4500 33.3% 35.9% 39.0% 42.7% 47.1% 52.6% 59.5% 68.4% 80.5%
5000 35.7% 38.4% 41.6% 45.3% 49.8% 55.2% 62.0% 70.6% 82.1%
5500 37.9% 40.7% 43.9% 47.7% 52.1% 57.5% 64.2% 72.6% 83.5%































Implicit probability of default
i
Recovery Value (as a % of principal)
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
50 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 1.6% 2.3% 4.1%
100 1.1% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.9% 2.4% 3.1% 4.4% 7.8%
150 1.6% 1.8% 2.1% 2.4% 2.9% 3.5% 4.6% 6.5% 11.3%
200 2.2% 2.4% 2.8% 3.2% 3.8% 4.6% 6.0% 8.5% 14.5%
250 2.7% 3.0% 3.4% 4.0% 4.7% 5.7% 7.4% 10.4% 17.5%
300 3.2% 3.6% 4.1% 4.7% 5.6% 6.8% 8.7% 12.2% 20.3%
350 3.7% 4.2% 4.7% 5.4% 6.4% 7.8% 10.0% 14.0% 22.9%
400 4.2% 4.7% 5.4% 6.2% 7.3% 8.9% 11.3% 15.6% 25.4%
450 4.8% 5.3% 6.0% 6.9% 8.1% 9.9% 12.5% 17.3% 27.7%
500 5.3% 5.9% 6.6% 7.6% 8.9% 10.8% 13.7% 18.8% 29.8%
550 5.7% 6.4% 7.2% 8.3% 9.7% 11.8% 14.9% 20.3% 31.9%
600 6.2% 6.9% 7.8% 9.0% 10.5% 12.7% 16.1% 21.8% 33.8%
650 6.7% 7.5% 8.4% 9.7% 11.3% 13.6% 17.2% 23.2% 35.6%
700 7.2% 8.0% 9.0% 10.3% 12.1% 14.5% 18.2% 24.5% 37.3%
750 7.7% 8.5% 9.6% 11.0% 12.8% 15.4% 19.3% 25.8% 38.9%
800 8.1% 9.1% 10.2% 11.6% 13.6% 16.3% 20.3% 27.1% 40.5%
850 8.6% 9.6% 10.7% 12.3% 14.3% 17.1% 21.3% 28.3% 41.9%
900 9.1% 10.1% 11.3% 12.9% 15.0% 17.9% 22.3% 29.4% 43.3%
950 9.5% 10.6% 11.9% 13.5% 15.7% 18.7% 23.2% 30.6% 44.7%
1000 10.0% 11.1% 12.4% 14.1% 16.4% 19.5% 24.2% 31.7% 45.9%
1050 10.4% 11.6% 12.9% 14.7% 17.1% 20.3% 25.1% 32.7% 47.2%
1100 10.9% 12.0% 13.5% 15.3% 17.7% 21.1% 26.0% 33.8% 48.3%
1150 11.3% 12.5% 14.0% 15.9% 18.4% 21.8% 26.8% 34.8% 49.4%
1200 11.7% 13.0% 14.5% 16.5% 19.1% 22.6% 27.7% 35.7% 50.5%
1250 12.2% 13.5% 15.0% 17.1% 19.7% 23.3% 28.5% 36.7% 51.5%
1300 12.6% 13.9% 15.6% 17.6% 20.3% 24.0% 29.3% 37.6% 52.5%
1350 13.0% 14.4% 16.1% 18.2% 20.9% 24.7% 30.1% 38.5% 53.4%
1400 13.4% 14.8% 16.6% 18.7% 21.5% 25.4% 30.9% 39.4% 54.3%
1450 13.8% 15.3% 17.0% 19.3% 22.1% 26.0% 31.6% 40.2% 55.2%
1500 14.3% 15.7% 17.5% 19.8% 22.7% 26.7% 32.3% 41.0% 56.0%
1550 14.7% 16.2% 18.0% 20.3% 23.3% 27.3% 33.1% 41.8% 56.9%
1600 15.1% 16.6% 18.5% 20.8% 23.9% 28.0% 33.8% 42.6% 57.6%
1650 15.5% 17.0% 18.9% 21.3% 24.5% 28.6% 34.5% 43.3% 58.4%
1700 15.9% 17.5% 19.4% 21.9% 25.0% 29.2% 35.1% 44.1% 59.1%
1750 16.2% 17.9% 19.9% 22.4% 25.6% 29.8% 35.8% 44.8% 59.8%
1800 16.6% 18.3% 20.3% 22.8% 26.1% 30.4% 36.5% 45.5% 60.5%
1850 17.0% 18.7% 20.8% 23.3% 26.6% 31.0% 37.1% 46.2% 61.1%
1900 17.4% 19.1% 21.2% 23.8% 27.2% 31.6% 37.7% 46.8% 61.8%
1950 17.8% 19.5% 21.6% 24.3% 27.7% 32.1% 38.3% 47.5% 62.4%
2000 18.1% 19.9% 22.1% 24.8% 28.2% 32.7% 38.9% 48.1% 63.0%
2500 21.7% 23.7% 26.2% 29.1% 32.9% 37.8% 44.3% 53.7% 68.0%
3000 25.0% 27.2% 29.8% 33.0% 37.0% 42.1% 48.9% 58.2% 71.8%
3500 28.0% 30.3% 33.1% 36.5% 40.7% 45.9% 52.7% 61.9% 74.8%
4000 30.7% 33.2% 36.2% 39.7% 44.0% 49.3% 56.0% 65.0% 77.3%
4500 33.3% 35.9% 38.9% 42.5% 46.9% 52.2% 58.9% 67.6% 79.3%
5000 35.7% 38.3% 41.5% 45.1% 49.5% 54.8% 61.4% 69.9% 81.0%
5500 37.9% 40.6% 43.8% 47.5% 51.9% 57.2% 63.7% 71.8% 82.4%





























Implicit probability of default
i
Recovery Value (as a % of principal)
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
50 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 1.5% 2.2% 3.8%
100 1.1% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.9% 2.3% 3.0% 4.3% 7.3%
150 1.6% 1.8% 2.1% 2.4% 2.8% 3.5% 4.5% 6.3% 10.6%
200 2.2% 2.4% 2.7% 3.2% 3.7% 4.6% 5.9% 8.2% 13.7%
250 2.7% 3.0% 3.4% 3.9% 4.6% 5.7% 7.2% 10.1% 16.5%
300 3.2% 3.6% 4.1% 4.7% 5.5% 6.7% 8.6% 11.8% 19.2%
350 3.7% 4.2% 4.7% 5.4% 6.4% 7.7% 9.8% 13.6% 21.7%
400 4.2% 4.7% 5.3% 6.1% 7.2% 8.7% 11.1% 15.2% 24.1%
450 4.7% 5.3% 6.0% 6.9% 8.0% 9.7% 12.3% 16.8% 26.3%
500 5.2% 5.8% 6.6% 7.6% 8.9% 10.7% 13.5% 18.3% 28.4%
550 5.7% 6.4% 7.2% 8.3% 9.7% 11.6% 14.7% 19.8% 30.4%
600 6.2% 6.9% 7.8% 8.9% 10.4% 12.6% 15.8% 21.2% 32.2%
650 6.7% 7.5% 8.4% 9.6% 11.2% 13.5% 16.9% 22.5% 34.0%
700 7.2% 8.0% 9.0% 10.3% 12.0% 14.4% 17.9% 23.9% 35.7%
750 7.7% 8.5% 9.6% 10.9% 12.7% 15.2% 19.0% 25.1% 37.3%
800 8.1% 9.0% 10.1% 11.6% 13.5% 16.1% 20.0% 26.4% 38.8%
850 8.6% 9.5% 10.7% 12.2% 14.2% 16.9% 21.0% 27.6% 40.2%
900 9.1% 10.0% 11.3% 12.8% 14.9% 17.7% 21.9% 28.7% 41.6%
950 9.5% 10.5% 11.8% 13.4% 15.6% 18.5% 22.9% 29.8% 42.9%
1000 10.0% 11.0% 12.4% 14.1% 16.3% 19.3% 23.8% 30.9% 44.2%
1050 10.4% 11.5% 12.9% 14.7% 16.9% 20.1% 24.7% 32.0% 45.4%
1100 10.9% 12.0% 13.4% 15.2% 17.6% 20.9% 25.6% 33.0% 46.6%
1150 11.3% 12.5% 14.0% 15.8% 18.3% 21.6% 26.4% 34.0% 47.7%
1200 11.7% 13.0% 14.5% 16.4% 18.9% 22.3% 27.2% 35.0% 48.7%
1250 12.2% 13.4% 15.0% 17.0% 19.5% 23.0% 28.1% 35.9% 49.8%
1300 12.6% 13.9% 15.5% 17.5% 20.2% 23.7% 28.9% 36.8% 50.7%
1350 13.0% 14.3% 16.0% 18.1% 20.8% 24.4% 29.6% 37.7% 51.7%
1400 13.4% 14.8% 16.5% 18.6% 21.4% 25.1% 30.4% 38.5% 52.6%
1450 13.8% 15.2% 17.0% 19.2% 22.0% 25.8% 31.2% 39.4% 53.5%
1500 14.2% 15.7% 17.5% 19.7% 22.6% 26.4% 31.9% 40.2% 54.3%
1550 14.7% 16.1% 17.9% 20.2% 23.1% 27.1% 32.6% 41.0% 55.1%
1600 15.1% 16.6% 18.4% 20.7% 23.7% 27.7% 33.3% 41.7% 55.9%
1650 15.5% 17.0% 18.9% 21.2% 24.3% 28.3% 34.0% 42.5% 56.7%
1700 15.8% 17.4% 19.3% 21.7% 24.8% 28.9% 34.7% 43.2% 57.4%
1750 16.2% 17.8% 19.8% 22.2% 25.4% 29.5% 35.3% 43.9% 58.1%
1800 16.6% 18.3% 20.3% 22.7% 25.9% 30.1% 36.0% 44.6% 58.8%
1850 17.0% 18.7% 20.7% 23.2% 26.4% 30.7% 36.6% 45.3% 59.4%
1900 17.4% 19.1% 21.1% 23.7% 27.0% 31.3% 37.2% 46.0% 60.1%
1950 17.8% 19.5% 21.6% 24.2% 27.5% 31.8% 37.8% 46.6% 60.7%
2000 18.1% 19.9% 22.0% 24.6% 28.0% 32.4% 38.4% 47.2% 61.3%
2500 21.7% 23.7% 26.1% 29.0% 32.7% 37.5% 43.8% 52.8% 66.5%
3000 24.9% 27.1% 29.7% 32.9% 36.8% 41.8% 48.4% 57.3% 70.4%
3500 27.9% 30.3% 33.1% 36.4% 40.5% 45.6% 52.2% 61.0% 73.5%
4000 30.7% 33.2% 36.1% 39.5% 43.7% 48.9% 55.5% 64.2% 76.0%
4500 33.3% 35.8% 38.8% 42.4% 46.7% 51.9% 58.4% 66.8% 78.1%
5000 35.6% 38.3% 41.4% 45.0% 49.3% 54.5% 60.9% 69.1% 79.8%
5500 37.9% 40.6% 43.7% 47.3% 51.7% 56.8% 63.2% 71.1% 81.3%




























Implicit probability of default
i
Recovery Value (as a % of principal)
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
50 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 1.5% 2.1% 3.6%
100 1.1% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.9% 2.3% 3.0% 4.2% 6.9%
150 1.6% 1.8% 2.1% 2.4% 2.8% 3.4% 4.4% 6.1% 10.0%
200 2.2% 2.4% 2.7% 3.1% 3.7% 4.5% 5.8% 8.0% 12.9%
250 2.7% 3.0% 3.4% 3.9% 4.6% 5.6% 7.1% 9.8% 15.7%
300 3.2% 3.6% 4.0% 4.6% 5.5% 6.6% 8.4% 11.5% 18.2%
350 3.7% 4.2% 4.7% 5.4% 6.3% 7.6% 9.7% 13.2% 20.6%
400 4.2% 4.7% 5.3% 6.1% 7.2% 8.6% 10.9% 14.8% 22.9%
450 4.7% 5.3% 5.9% 6.8% 8.0% 9.6% 12.1% 16.3% 25.1%
500 5.2% 5.8% 6.6% 7.5% 8.8% 10.6% 13.3% 17.8% 27.1%
550 5.7% 6.4% 7.2% 8.2% 9.6% 11.5% 14.4% 19.2% 29.0%
600 6.2% 6.9% 7.8% 8.9% 10.4% 12.4% 15.5% 20.6% 30.8%
650 6.7% 7.4% 8.4% 9.6% 11.1% 13.3% 16.6% 22.0% 32.6%
700 7.2% 8.0% 9.0% 10.2% 11.9% 14.2% 17.6% 23.3% 34.2%
750 7.7% 8.5% 9.5% 10.9% 12.6% 15.1% 18.7% 24.5% 35.8%
800 8.1% 9.0% 10.1% 11.5% 13.4% 15.9% 19.7% 25.7% 37.3%
850 8.6% 9.5% 10.7% 12.1% 14.1% 16.7% 20.6% 26.9% 38.7%
900 9.1% 10.0% 11.2% 12.8% 14.8% 17.5% 21.6% 28.1% 40.1%
950 9.5% 10.5% 11.8% 13.4% 15.5% 18.3% 22.5% 29.2% 41.4%
1000 10.0% 11.0% 12.3% 14.0% 16.1% 19.1% 23.4% 30.2% 42.6%
1050 10.4% 11.5% 12.9% 14.6% 16.8% 19.9% 24.3% 31.3% 43.8%
1100 10.8% 12.0% 13.4% 15.2% 17.5% 20.6% 25.2% 32.3% 45.0%
1150 11.3% 12.5% 13.9% 15.7% 18.1% 21.4% 26.0% 33.3% 46.1%
1200 11.7% 12.9% 14.4% 16.3% 18.8% 22.1% 26.9% 34.2% 47.1%
1250 12.1% 13.4% 14.9% 16.9% 19.4% 22.8% 27.7% 35.1% 48.1%
1300 12.6% 13.9% 15.4% 17.4% 20.0% 23.5% 28.5% 36.0% 49.1%
1350 13.0% 14.3% 15.9% 18.0% 20.6% 24.2% 29.2% 36.9% 50.1%
1400 13.4% 14.8% 16.4% 18.5% 21.2% 24.9% 30.0% 37.8% 51.0%
1450 13.8% 15.2% 16.9% 19.1% 21.8% 25.5% 30.7% 38.6% 51.9%
1500 14.2% 15.7% 17.4% 19.6% 22.4% 26.2% 31.5% 39.4% 52.7%
1550 14.6% 16.1% 17.9% 20.1% 23.0% 26.8% 32.2% 40.2% 53.5%
1600 15.0% 16.5% 18.4% 20.6% 23.6% 27.4% 32.9% 40.9% 54.3%
1650 15.4% 17.0% 18.8% 21.1% 24.1% 28.1% 33.5% 41.7% 55.1%
1700 15.8% 17.4% 19.3% 21.6% 24.7% 28.7% 34.2% 42.4% 55.8%
1750 16.2% 17.8% 19.7% 22.1% 25.2% 29.3% 34.9% 43.1% 56.5%
1800 16.6% 18.2% 20.2% 22.6% 25.7% 29.8% 35.5% 43.8% 57.2%
1850 17.0% 18.6% 20.6% 23.1% 26.3% 30.4% 36.1% 44.5% 57.9%
1900 17.4% 19.0% 21.1% 23.6% 26.8% 31.0% 36.8% 45.2% 58.5%
1950 17.7% 19.4% 21.5% 24.1% 27.3% 31.5% 37.4% 45.8% 59.2%
2000 18.1% 19.8% 21.9% 24.5% 27.8% 32.1% 38.0% 46.4% 59.8%
2500 21.7% 23.6% 26.0% 28.9% 32.5% 37.1% 43.3% 52.0% 65.0%
3000 24.9% 27.1% 29.7% 32.8% 36.6% 41.5% 47.9% 56.5% 69.0%
3500 27.9% 30.2% 33.0% 36.3% 40.3% 45.3% 51.7% 60.3% 72.2%
4000 30.7% 33.1% 36.0% 39.4% 43.5% 48.6% 55.0% 63.4% 74.8%
4500 33.2% 35.8% 38.7% 42.2% 46.4% 51.5% 57.9% 66.1% 77.0%
5000 35.6% 38.2% 41.3% 44.8% 49.1% 54.2% 60.5% 68.4% 78.8%
5500 37.8% 40.5% 43.6% 47.2% 51.4% 56.5% 62.7% 70.4% 80.3%




























Implicit probability of default
i
Recovery Value (as a % of principal)
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
50 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 1.2% 1.5% 2.1% 3.4%
100 1.1% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.9% 2.3% 2.9% 4.0% 6.5%
150 1.6% 1.8% 2.1% 2.4% 2.8% 3.4% 4.3% 5.9% 9.5%
200 2.2% 2.4% 2.7% 3.1% 3.7% 4.5% 5.7% 7.7% 12.3%
250 2.7% 3.0% 3.4% 3.9% 4.6% 5.5% 7.0% 9.5% 14.9%
300 3.2% 3.6% 4.0% 4.6% 5.4% 6.5% 8.3% 11.2% 17.4%
350 3.7% 4.1% 4.7% 5.4% 6.3% 7.6% 9.5% 12.8% 19.7%
400 4.2% 4.7% 5.3% 6.1% 7.1% 8.5% 10.7% 14.4% 21.9%
450 4.7% 5.3% 5.9% 6.8% 7.9% 9.5% 11.9% 15.9% 24.0%
500 5.2% 5.8% 6.5% 7.5% 8.7% 10.4% 13.0% 17.4% 25.9%
550 5.7% 6.4% 7.1% 8.2% 9.5% 11.4% 14.2% 18.8% 27.8%
600 6.2% 6.9% 7.7% 8.8% 10.3% 12.3% 15.3% 20.1% 29.6%
650 6.7% 7.4% 8.3% 9.5% 11.0% 13.2% 16.3% 21.4% 31.3%
700 7.2% 8.0% 8.9% 10.2% 11.8% 14.0% 17.4% 22.7% 32.9%
750 7.7% 8.5% 9.5% 10.8% 12.5% 14.9% 18.4% 24.0% 34.4%
800 8.1% 9.0% 10.1% 11.4% 13.2% 15.7% 19.4% 25.1% 35.9%
850 8.6% 9.5% 10.6% 12.1% 14.0% 16.6% 20.3% 26.3% 37.3%
900 9.0% 10.0% 11.2% 12.7% 14.7% 17.4% 21.3% 27.4% 38.7%
950 9.5% 10.5% 11.7% 13.3% 15.4% 18.1% 22.2% 28.5% 39.9%
1000 10.0% 11.0% 12.3% 13.9% 16.0% 18.9% 23.1% 29.6% 41.2%
1050 10.4% 11.5% 12.8% 14.5% 16.7% 19.7% 24.0% 30.6% 42.4%
1100 10.8% 12.0% 13.3% 15.1% 17.4% 20.4% 24.8% 31.6% 43.5%
1150 11.3% 12.4% 13.9% 15.7% 18.0% 21.2% 25.7% 32.6% 44.6%
1200 11.7% 12.9% 14.4% 16.2% 18.6% 21.9% 26.5% 33.5% 45.7%
1250 12.1% 13.4% 14.9% 16.8% 19.3% 22.6% 27.3% 34.4% 46.7%
1300 12.6% 13.8% 15.4% 17.4% 19.9% 23.3% 28.1% 35.3% 47.6%
1350 13.0% 14.3% 15.9% 17.9% 20.5% 24.0% 28.8% 36.2% 48.6%
1400 13.4% 14.7% 16.4% 18.4% 21.1% 24.6% 29.6% 37.0% 49.5%
1450 13.8% 15.2% 16.9% 19.0% 21.7% 25.3% 30.3% 37.8% 50.4%
1500 14.2% 15.6% 17.4% 19.5% 22.3% 25.9% 31.0% 38.7% 51.2%
1550 14.6% 16.1% 17.8% 20.0% 22.8% 26.6% 31.7% 39.4% 52.0%
1600 15.0% 16.5% 18.3% 20.5% 23.4% 27.2% 32.4% 40.2% 52.8%
1650 15.4% 16.9% 18.8% 21.0% 24.0% 27.8% 33.1% 40.9% 53.6%
1700 15.8% 17.4% 19.2% 21.5% 24.5% 28.4% 33.8% 41.7% 54.3%
1750 16.2% 17.8% 19.7% 22.0% 25.0% 29.0% 34.4% 42.4% 55.1%
1800 16.6% 18.2% 20.1% 22.5% 25.6% 29.6% 35.1% 43.1% 55.8%
1850 17.0% 18.6% 20.6% 23.0% 26.1% 30.2% 35.7% 43.7% 56.4%
1900 17.4% 19.0% 21.0% 23.5% 26.6% 30.7% 36.3% 44.4% 57.1%
1950 17.7% 19.4% 21.4% 24.0% 27.1% 31.3% 36.9% 45.0% 57.7%
2000 18.1% 19.8% 21.9% 24.4% 27.6% 31.8% 37.5% 45.7% 58.3%
2500 21.6% 23.6% 25.9% 28.8% 32.3% 36.8% 42.9% 51.2% 63.6%
3000 24.9% 27.0% 29.6% 32.6% 36.4% 41.2% 47.4% 55.8% 67.7%
3500 27.9% 30.2% 32.9% 36.1% 40.1% 45.0% 51.2% 59.5% 71.0%
4000 30.7% 33.1% 35.9% 39.3% 43.3% 48.3% 54.5% 62.7% 73.7%
4500 33.2% 35.7% 38.7% 42.1% 46.2% 51.2% 57.4% 65.4% 75.9%
5000 35.6% 38.2% 41.2% 44.7% 48.8% 53.8% 60.0% 67.7% 77.8%
5500 37.8% 40.5% 43.5% 47.0% 51.2% 56.2% 62.3% 69.8% 79.4%





























Implicit probability of default
i
Recovery Value (as a % of principal)
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
50 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 1.1% 1.5% 2.0% 3.2%
100 1.1% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.9% 2.3% 2.9% 3.9% 6.2%
150 1.6% 1.8% 2.0% 2.4% 2.8% 3.3% 4.2% 5.8% 9.0%
200 2.2% 2.4% 2.7% 3.1% 3.6% 4.4% 5.6% 7.5% 11.7%
250 2.7% 3.0% 3.4% 3.9% 4.5% 5.4% 6.9% 9.2% 14.2%
300 3.2% 3.6% 4.0% 4.6% 5.4% 6.5% 8.1% 10.9% 16.6%
350 3.7% 4.1% 4.7% 5.3% 6.2% 7.5% 9.3% 12.5% 18.8%
400 4.2% 4.7% 5.3% 6.0% 7.0% 8.4% 10.5% 14.0% 20.9%
450 4.7% 5.3% 5.9% 6.7% 7.8% 9.4% 11.7% 15.5% 23.0%
500 5.2% 5.8% 6.5% 7.4% 8.6% 10.3% 12.8% 16.9% 24.9%
550 5.7% 6.3% 7.1% 8.1% 9.4% 11.2% 13.9% 18.3% 26.7%
600 6.2% 6.9% 7.7% 8.8% 10.2% 12.1% 15.0% 19.7% 28.4%
650 6.7% 7.4% 8.3% 9.5% 11.0% 13.0% 16.1% 20.9% 30.1%
700 7.2% 7.9% 8.9% 10.1% 11.7% 13.9% 17.1% 22.2% 31.7%
750 7.6% 8.5% 9.5% 10.8% 12.4% 14.7% 18.1% 23.4% 33.2%
800 8.1% 9.0% 10.0% 11.4% 13.2% 15.6% 19.1% 24.6% 34.6%
850 8.6% 9.5% 10.6% 12.0% 13.9% 16.4% 20.0% 25.7% 36.0%
900 9.0% 10.0% 11.2% 12.6% 14.6% 17.2% 20.9% 26.8% 37.4%
950 9.5% 10.5% 11.7% 13.2% 15.2% 18.0% 21.9% 27.9% 38.6%
1000 9.9% 11.0% 12.2% 13.8% 15.9% 18.7% 22.7% 29.0% 39.8%
1050 10.4% 11.5% 12.8% 14.4% 16.6% 19.5% 23.6% 30.0% 41.0%
1100 10.8% 11.9% 13.3% 15.0% 17.2% 20.2% 24.5% 31.0% 42.2%
1150 11.3% 12.4% 13.8% 15.6% 17.9% 20.9% 25.3% 31.9% 43.2%
1200 11.7% 12.9% 14.3% 16.2% 18.5% 21.7% 26.1% 32.9% 44.3%
1250 12.1% 13.4% 14.8% 16.7% 19.1% 22.4% 26.9% 33.8% 45.3%
1300 12.6% 13.8% 15.3% 17.3% 19.7% 23.1% 27.7% 34.6% 46.3%
1350 13.0% 14.3% 15.8% 17.8% 20.4% 23.7% 28.4% 35.5% 47.2%
1400 13.4% 14.7% 16.3% 18.4% 20.9% 24.4% 29.2% 36.3% 48.1%
1450 13.8% 15.2% 16.8% 18.9% 21.5% 25.0% 29.9% 37.2% 49.0%
1500 14.2% 15.6% 17.3% 19.4% 22.1% 25.7% 30.6% 37.9% 49.8%
1550 14.6% 16.0% 17.8% 19.9% 22.7% 26.3% 31.3% 38.7% 50.7%
1600 15.0% 16.5% 18.2% 20.4% 23.2% 26.9% 32.0% 39.5% 51.5%
1650 15.4% 16.9% 18.7% 20.9% 23.8% 27.5% 32.7% 40.2% 52.2%
1700 15.8% 17.3% 19.2% 21.4% 24.3% 28.1% 33.4% 40.9% 53.0%
1750 16.2% 17.7% 19.6% 21.9% 24.9% 28.7% 34.0% 41.6% 53.7%
1800 16.6% 18.2% 20.1% 22.4% 25.4% 29.3% 34.6% 42.3% 54.4%
1850 17.0% 18.6% 20.5% 22.9% 25.9% 29.9% 35.3% 43.0% 55.1%
1900 17.3% 19.0% 20.9% 23.4% 26.5% 30.5% 35.9% 43.6% 55.7%
1950 17.7% 19.4% 21.4% 23.8% 27.0% 31.0% 36.5% 44.3% 56.4%
2000 18.1% 19.8% 21.8% 24.3% 27.5% 31.5% 37.1% 44.9% 57.0%
2500 21.6% 23.6% 25.9% 28.6% 32.1% 36.6% 42.4% 50.5% 62.4%
3000 24.9% 27.0% 29.5% 32.5% 36.2% 40.9% 46.9% 55.0% 66.5%
3500 27.9% 30.1% 32.8% 36.0% 39.8% 44.6% 50.8% 58.8% 69.9%
4000 30.6% 33.0% 35.8% 39.1% 43.1% 48.0% 54.1% 62.0% 72.6%
4500 33.2% 35.7% 38.6% 42.0% 46.0% 50.9% 57.0% 64.7% 74.9%
5000 35.6% 38.1% 41.1% 44.5% 48.6% 53.5% 59.6% 67.1% 76.8%
5500 37.8% 40.4% 43.4% 46.9% 51.0% 55.9% 61.8% 69.2% 78.5%




























Implicit probability of default
i
Recovery Value (as a % of principal)
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
50 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 1.1% 1.4% 1.9% 3.1%
100 1.1% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.8% 2.2% 2.8% 3.8% 5.9%
150 1.6% 1.8% 2.0% 2.3% 2.7% 3.3% 4.2% 5.6% 8.6%
200 2.2% 2.4% 2.7% 3.1% 3.6% 4.4% 5.5% 7.3% 11.2%
250 2.7% 3.0% 3.4% 3.8% 4.5% 5.4% 6.7% 9.0% 13.6%
300 3.2% 3.6% 4.0% 4.6% 5.3% 6.4% 8.0% 10.6% 15.9%
350 3.7% 4.1% 4.6% 5.3% 6.2% 7.4% 9.2% 12.2% 18.1%
400 4.2% 4.7% 5.3% 6.0% 7.0% 8.3% 10.4% 13.7% 20.1%
450 4.7% 5.2% 5.9% 6.7% 7.8% 9.3% 11.5% 15.1% 22.1%
500 5.2% 5.8% 6.5% 7.4% 8.6% 10.2% 12.6% 16.5% 23.9%
550 5.7% 6.3% 7.1% 8.1% 9.4% 11.1% 13.7% 17.9% 25.7%
600 6.2% 6.9% 7.7% 8.7% 10.1% 12.0% 14.8% 19.2% 27.4%
650 6.7% 7.4% 8.3% 9.4% 10.9% 12.9% 15.8% 20.5% 29.0%
700 7.2% 7.9% 8.9% 10.1% 11.6% 13.7% 16.8% 21.7% 30.6%
750 7.6% 8.4% 9.4% 10.7% 12.3% 14.6% 17.8% 22.9% 32.1%
800 8.1% 9.0% 10.0% 11.3% 13.1% 15.4% 18.8% 24.1% 33.5%
850 8.6% 9.5% 10.6% 12.0% 13.8% 16.2% 19.7% 25.2% 34.9%
900 9.0% 10.0% 11.1% 12.6% 14.5% 17.0% 20.7% 26.3% 36.2%
950 9.5% 10.5% 11.7% 13.2% 15.1% 17.8% 21.6% 27.4% 37.4%
1000 9.9% 11.0% 12.2% 13.8% 15.8% 18.5% 22.4% 28.4% 38.6%
1050 10.4% 11.4% 12.7% 14.4% 16.5% 19.3% 23.3% 29.4% 39.8%
1100 10.8% 11.9% 13.3% 14.9% 17.1% 20.0% 24.1% 30.4% 40.9%
1150 11.3% 12.4% 13.8% 15.5% 17.8% 20.7% 25.0% 31.3% 42.0%
1200 11.7% 12.9% 14.3% 16.1% 18.4% 21.5% 25.8% 32.2% 43.0%
1250 12.1% 13.3% 14.8% 16.6% 19.0% 22.2% 26.6% 33.1% 44.0%
1300 12.5% 13.8% 15.3% 17.2% 19.6% 22.8% 27.3% 34.0% 45.0%
1350 13.0% 14.2% 15.8% 17.7% 20.2% 23.5% 28.1% 34.9% 45.9%
1400 13.4% 14.7% 16.3% 18.3% 20.8% 24.2% 28.8% 35.7% 46.8%
1450 13.8% 15.1% 16.8% 18.8% 21.4% 24.8% 29.5% 36.5% 47.7%
1500 14.2% 15.6% 17.2% 19.3% 22.0% 25.5% 30.3% 37.3% 48.6%
1550 14.6% 16.0% 17.7% 19.8% 22.5% 26.1% 31.0% 38.1% 49.4%
1600 15.0% 16.4% 18.2% 20.4% 23.1% 26.7% 31.6% 38.8% 50.2%
1650 15.4% 16.9% 18.7% 20.9% 23.6% 27.3% 32.3% 39.5% 50.9%
1700 15.8% 17.3% 19.1% 21.4% 24.2% 27.9% 33.0% 40.3% 51.7%
1750 16.2% 17.7% 19.6% 21.8% 24.7% 28.5% 33.6% 41.0% 52.4%
1800 16.6% 18.1% 20.0% 22.3% 25.3% 29.1% 34.2% 41.6% 53.1%
1850 16.9% 18.5% 20.5% 22.8% 25.8% 29.6% 34.9% 42.3% 53.8%
1900 17.3% 18.9% 20.9% 23.3% 26.3% 30.2% 35.5% 43.0% 54.5%
1950 17.7% 19.3% 21.3% 23.7% 26.8% 30.7% 36.1% 43.6% 55.1%
2000 18.1% 19.7% 21.7% 24.2% 27.3% 31.3% 36.6% 44.2% 55.7%
2500 21.6% 23.5% 25.8% 28.5% 31.9% 36.3% 42.0% 49.8% 61.1%
3000 24.9% 27.0% 29.4% 32.4% 36.0% 40.6% 46.5% 54.3% 65.4%
3500 27.9% 30.1% 32.7% 35.9% 39.7% 44.3% 50.3% 58.1% 68.8%
4000 30.6% 33.0% 35.7% 39.0% 42.9% 47.7% 53.6% 61.3% 71.6%
4500 33.2% 35.6% 38.5% 41.8% 45.8% 50.6% 56.5% 64.1% 73.9%
5000 35.5% 38.1% 41.0% 44.4% 48.4% 53.2% 59.1% 66.5% 75.9%
5500 37.8% 40.3% 43.3% 46.8% 50.8% 55.6% 61.4% 68.5% 77.6%




























Implicit probability of default
i
Recovery Value (as a % of principal)
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
50 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 1.1% 1.4% 1.9% 2.9%
100 1.1% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.8% 2.2% 2.8% 3.7% 5.7%
150 1.6% 1.8% 2.0% 2.3% 2.7% 3.3% 4.1% 5.5% 8.3%
200 2.2% 2.4% 2.7% 3.1% 3.6% 4.3% 5.4% 7.2% 10.7%
250 2.7% 3.0% 3.3% 3.8% 4.4% 5.3% 6.6% 8.8% 13.0%
300 3.2% 3.6% 4.0% 4.5% 5.3% 6.3% 7.9% 10.4% 15.3%
350 3.7% 4.1% 4.6% 5.3% 6.1% 7.3% 9.0% 11.9% 17.4%
400 4.2% 4.7% 5.2% 6.0% 6.9% 8.3% 10.2% 13.4% 19.4%
450 4.7% 5.2% 5.9% 6.7% 7.7% 9.2% 11.3% 14.8% 21.3%
500 5.2% 5.8% 6.5% 7.4% 8.5% 10.1% 12.4% 16.2% 23.1%
550 5.7% 6.3% 7.1% 8.0% 9.3% 11.0% 13.5% 17.5% 24.8%
600 6.2% 6.9% 7.7% 8.7% 10.0% 11.9% 14.6% 18.8% 26.5%
650 6.7% 7.4% 8.3% 9.4% 10.8% 12.8% 15.6% 20.0% 28.1%
700 7.2% 7.9% 8.8% 10.0% 11.5% 13.6% 16.6% 21.3% 29.6%
750 7.6% 8.4% 9.4% 10.6% 12.3% 14.4% 17.6% 22.4% 31.0%
800 8.1% 8.9% 10.0% 11.3% 13.0% 15.3% 18.5% 23.6% 32.4%
850 8.6% 9.4% 10.5% 11.9% 13.7% 16.1% 19.5% 24.7% 33.8%
900 9.0% 9.9% 11.1% 12.5% 14.4% 16.8% 20.4% 25.8% 35.1%
950 9.5% 10.4% 11.6% 13.1% 15.0% 17.6% 21.3% 26.8% 36.3%
1000 9.9% 10.9% 12.2% 13.7% 15.7% 18.4% 22.1% 27.8% 37.5%
1050 10.4% 11.4% 12.7% 14.3% 16.4% 19.1% 23.0% 28.8% 38.7%
1100 10.8% 11.9% 13.2% 14.9% 17.0% 19.8% 23.8% 29.8% 39.8%
1150 11.2% 12.4% 13.7% 15.4% 17.6% 20.6% 24.6% 30.7% 40.8%
1200 11.7% 12.8% 14.2% 16.0% 18.3% 21.3% 25.4% 31.6% 41.9%
1250 12.1% 13.3% 14.8% 16.6% 18.9% 22.0% 26.2% 32.5% 42.9%
1300 12.5% 13.8% 15.3% 17.1% 19.5% 22.6% 27.0% 33.4% 43.8%
1350 13.0% 14.2% 15.7% 17.7% 20.1% 23.3% 27.7% 34.2% 44.8%
1400 13.4% 14.7% 16.2% 18.2% 20.7% 24.0% 28.5% 35.1% 45.7%
1450 13.8% 15.1% 16.7% 18.7% 21.3% 24.6% 29.2% 35.9% 46.5%
1500 14.2% 15.5% 17.2% 19.2% 21.8% 25.2% 29.9% 36.7% 47.4%
1550 14.6% 16.0% 17.7% 19.8% 22.4% 25.9% 30.6% 37.4% 48.2%
1600 15.0% 16.4% 18.1% 20.3% 23.0% 26.5% 31.3% 38.2% 49.0%
1650 15.4% 16.8% 18.6% 20.8% 23.5% 27.1% 31.9% 38.9% 49.7%
1700 15.8% 17.3% 19.1% 21.3% 24.0% 27.7% 32.6% 39.6% 50.5%
1750 16.2% 17.7% 19.5% 21.7% 24.6% 28.3% 33.2% 40.3% 51.2%
1800 16.6% 18.1% 20.0% 22.2% 25.1% 28.8% 33.8% 41.0% 51.9%
1850 16.9% 18.5% 20.4% 22.7% 25.6% 29.4% 34.5% 41.6% 52.6%
1900 17.3% 18.9% 20.8% 23.2% 26.1% 29.9% 35.1% 42.3% 53.3%
1950 17.7% 19.3% 21.3% 23.6% 26.6% 30.5% 35.7% 42.9% 53.9%
2000 18.1% 19.7% 21.7% 24.1% 27.1% 31.0% 36.2% 43.5% 54.5%
2500 21.6% 23.5% 25.7% 28.4% 31.8% 36.0% 41.5% 49.1% 60.0%
3000 24.8% 26.9% 29.3% 32.3% 35.8% 40.3% 46.0% 53.6% 64.3%
3500 27.8% 30.0% 32.6% 35.7% 39.5% 44.1% 49.9% 57.4% 67.7%
4000 30.6% 32.9% 35.6% 38.8% 42.7% 47.4% 53.2% 60.7% 70.6%
4500 33.2% 35.6% 38.4% 41.7% 45.6% 50.3% 56.1% 63.4% 73.0%
5000 35.5% 38.0% 40.9% 44.3% 48.2% 52.9% 58.7% 65.9% 75.0%
5500 37.7% 40.3% 43.2% 46.6% 50.6% 55.3% 61.0% 68.0% 76.7%




























Implicit probability of default
i
Recovery Value (as a % of principal)
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
50 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 1.1% 1.4% 1.8% 2.8%
100 1.1% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.8% 2.2% 2.7% 3.6% 5.4%
150 1.6% 1.8% 2.0% 2.3% 2.7% 3.2% 4.0% 5.3% 7.9%
200 2.2% 2.4% 2.7% 3.1% 3.6% 4.3% 5.3% 7.0% 10.3%
250 2.7% 3.0% 3.3% 3.8% 4.4% 5.3% 6.5% 8.6% 12.5%
300 3.2% 3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 5.3% 6.3% 7.7% 10.1% 14.7%
350 3.7% 4.1% 4.6% 5.2% 6.1% 7.2% 8.9% 11.6% 16.7%
400 4.2% 4.7% 5.2% 5.9% 6.9% 8.2% 10.1% 13.1% 18.7%
450 4.7% 5.2% 5.8% 6.6% 7.7% 9.1% 11.2% 14.5% 20.5%
500 5.2% 5.8% 6.5% 7.3% 8.5% 10.0% 12.3% 15.8% 22.3%
550 5.7% 6.3% 7.1% 8.0% 9.2% 10.9% 13.3% 17.1% 24.0%
600 6.2% 6.8% 7.6% 8.7% 10.0% 11.8% 14.4% 18.4% 25.6%
650 6.7% 7.4% 8.2% 9.3% 10.7% 12.6% 15.4% 19.6% 27.2%
700 7.2% 7.9% 8.8% 10.0% 11.5% 13.5% 16.4% 20.8% 28.7%
750 7.6% 8.4% 9.4% 10.6% 12.2% 14.3% 17.3% 22.0% 30.1%
800 8.1% 8.9% 9.9% 11.2% 12.9% 15.1% 18.3% 23.1% 31.5%
850 8.6% 9.4% 10.5% 11.8% 13.6% 15.9% 19.2% 24.2% 32.8%
900 9.0% 9.9% 11.0% 12.4% 14.3% 16.7% 20.1% 25.3% 34.1%
950 9.5% 10.4% 11.6% 13.0% 14.9% 17.4% 21.0% 26.3% 35.3%
1000 9.9% 10.9% 12.1% 13.6% 15.6% 18.2% 21.8% 27.3% 36.5%
1050 10.4% 11.4% 12.7% 14.2% 16.2% 18.9% 22.7% 28.3% 37.6%
1100 10.8% 11.9% 13.2% 14.8% 16.9% 19.7% 23.5% 29.3% 38.7%
1150 11.2% 12.3% 13.7% 15.4% 17.5% 20.4% 24.3% 30.2% 39.7%
1200 11.7% 12.8% 14.2% 15.9% 18.1% 21.1% 25.1% 31.1% 40.8%
1250 12.1% 13.3% 14.7% 16.5% 18.8% 21.8% 25.9% 32.0% 41.8%
1300 12.5% 13.7% 15.2% 17.0% 19.4% 22.4% 26.7% 32.8% 42.7%
1350 12.9% 14.2% 15.7% 17.6% 20.0% 23.1% 27.4% 33.7% 43.6%
1400 13.4% 14.6% 16.2% 18.1% 20.5% 23.7% 28.1% 34.5% 44.5%
1450 13.8% 15.1% 16.7% 18.6% 21.1% 24.4% 28.8% 35.3% 45.4%
1500 14.2% 15.5% 17.1% 19.2% 21.7% 25.0% 29.5% 36.1% 46.3%
1550 14.6% 16.0% 17.6% 19.7% 22.3% 25.6% 30.2% 36.8% 47.1%
1600 15.0% 16.4% 18.1% 20.2% 22.8% 26.2% 30.9% 37.6% 47.9%
1650 15.4% 16.8% 18.5% 20.7% 23.4% 26.8% 31.6% 38.3% 48.6%
1700 15.8% 17.2% 19.0% 21.2% 23.9% 27.4% 32.2% 39.0% 49.4%
1750 16.2% 17.6% 19.4% 21.7% 24.4% 28.0% 32.8% 39.7% 50.1%
1800 16.5% 18.1% 19.9% 22.1% 25.0% 28.6% 33.5% 40.4% 50.8%
1850 16.9% 18.5% 20.3% 22.6% 25.5% 29.2% 34.1% 41.0% 51.5%
1900 17.3% 18.9% 20.8% 23.1% 26.0% 29.7% 34.7% 41.7% 52.2%
1950 17.7% 19.3% 21.2% 23.5% 26.5% 30.3% 35.3% 42.3% 52.8%
2000 18.0% 19.7% 21.6% 24.0% 27.0% 30.8% 35.9% 42.9% 53.4%
2500 21.6% 23.4% 25.6% 28.3% 31.6% 35.7% 41.1% 48.4% 58.9%
3000 24.8% 26.9% 29.3% 32.2% 35.7% 40.0% 45.6% 53.0% 63.2%
3500 27.8% 30.0% 32.6% 35.6% 39.3% 43.8% 49.4% 56.8% 66.8%
4000 30.6% 32.9% 35.6% 38.7% 42.5% 47.1% 52.8% 60.1% 69.6%
4500 33.1% 35.5% 38.3% 41.6% 45.4% 50.0% 55.7% 62.8% 72.1%
5000 35.5% 38.0% 40.8% 44.1% 48.0% 52.7% 58.3% 65.3% 74.1%
5500 37.7% 40.2% 43.1% 46.5% 50.4% 55.0% 60.6% 67.4% 75.9%




























Implicit probability of default
i
Recovery Value (as a % of principal)
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
50 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 1.1% 1.4% 1.8% 2.7%
100 1.1% 1.2% 1.4% 1.5% 1.8% 2.2% 2.7% 3.5% 5.2%
150 1.6% 1.8% 2.0% 2.3% 2.7% 3.2% 4.0% 5.2% 7.6%
200 2.2% 2.4% 2.7% 3.0% 3.5% 4.2% 5.2% 6.8% 9.9%
250 2.7% 3.0% 3.3% 3.8% 4.4% 5.2% 6.4% 8.4% 12.1%
300 3.2% 3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 5.2% 6.2% 7.6% 9.9% 14.2%
350 3.7% 4.1% 4.6% 5.2% 6.0% 7.1% 8.8% 11.4% 16.1%
400 4.2% 4.7% 5.2% 5.9% 6.8% 8.1% 9.9% 12.8% 18.0%
450 4.7% 5.2% 5.8% 6.6% 7.6% 9.0% 11.0% 14.2% 19.8%
500 5.2% 5.8% 6.4% 7.3% 8.4% 9.9% 12.1% 15.5% 21.6%
550 5.7% 6.3% 7.0% 8.0% 9.2% 10.8% 13.1% 16.8% 23.2%
600 6.2% 6.8% 7.6% 8.6% 9.9% 11.7% 14.2% 18.0% 24.8%
650 6.7% 7.4% 8.2% 9.3% 10.6% 12.5% 15.2% 19.2% 26.3%
700 7.1% 7.9% 8.8% 9.9% 11.4% 13.3% 16.1% 20.4% 27.8%
750 7.6% 8.4% 9.3% 10.5% 12.1% 14.2% 17.1% 21.6% 29.2%
800 8.1% 8.9% 9.9% 11.2% 12.8% 15.0% 18.0% 22.7% 30.6%
850 8.6% 9.4% 10.5% 11.8% 13.5% 15.8% 18.9% 23.8% 31.9%
900 9.0% 9.9% 11.0% 12.4% 14.2% 16.5% 19.8% 24.8% 33.1%
950 9.5% 10.4% 11.6% 13.0% 14.8% 17.3% 20.7% 25.8% 34.3%
1000 9.9% 10.9% 12.1% 13.6% 15.5% 18.0% 21.6% 26.8% 35.5%
1050 10.4% 11.4% 12.6% 14.2% 16.1% 18.8% 22.4% 27.8% 36.6%
1100 10.8% 11.9% 13.1% 14.7% 16.8% 19.5% 23.2% 28.7% 37.7%
1150 11.2% 12.3% 13.7% 15.3% 17.4% 20.2% 24.0% 29.7% 38.7%
1200 11.7% 12.8% 14.2% 15.9% 18.0% 20.9% 24.8% 30.6% 39.8%
1250 12.1% 13.3% 14.7% 16.4% 18.6% 21.6% 25.6% 31.4% 40.7%
1300 12.5% 13.7% 15.2% 17.0% 19.2% 22.2% 26.3% 32.3% 41.7%
1350 12.9% 14.2% 15.7% 17.5% 19.8% 22.9% 27.1% 33.1% 42.6%
1400 13.3% 14.6% 16.1% 18.0% 20.4% 23.5% 27.8% 33.9% 43.5%
1450 13.8% 15.1% 16.6% 18.6% 21.0% 24.2% 28.5% 34.7% 44.4%
1500 14.2% 15.5% 17.1% 19.1% 21.6% 24.8% 29.2% 35.5% 45.2%
1550 14.6% 15.9% 17.6% 19.6% 22.1% 25.4% 29.9% 36.2% 46.0%
1600 15.0% 16.4% 18.0% 20.1% 22.7% 26.0% 30.6% 37.0% 46.8%
1650 15.4% 16.8% 18.5% 20.6% 23.2% 26.6% 31.2% 37.7% 47.6%
1700 15.8% 17.2% 18.9% 21.1% 23.8% 27.2% 31.9% 38.4% 48.3%
1750 16.1% 17.6% 19.4% 21.6% 24.3% 27.8% 32.5% 39.1% 49.0%
1800 16.5% 18.0% 19.8% 22.0% 24.8% 28.4% 33.1% 39.8% 49.7%
1850 16.9% 18.4% 20.3% 22.5% 25.3% 28.9% 33.7% 40.4% 50.4%
1900 17.3% 18.8% 20.7% 23.0% 25.8% 29.5% 34.3% 41.1% 51.1%
1950 17.7% 19.2% 21.1% 23.5% 26.3% 30.0% 34.9% 41.7% 51.7%
2000 18.0% 19.6% 21.6% 23.9% 26.8% 30.6% 35.5% 42.3% 52.4%
2500 21.6% 23.4% 25.6% 28.2% 31.4% 35.5% 40.7% 47.8% 57.9%
3000 24.8% 26.8% 29.2% 32.0% 35.5% 39.8% 45.2% 52.4% 62.3%
3500 27.8% 30.0% 32.5% 35.5% 39.1% 43.5% 49.0% 56.2% 65.8%
4000 30.6% 32.8% 35.5% 38.6% 42.3% 46.8% 52.4% 59.5% 68.8%
4500 33.1% 35.5% 38.2% 41.4% 45.2% 49.7% 55.3% 62.3% 71.2%
5000 35.5% 37.9% 40.7% 44.0% 47.8% 52.4% 57.9% 64.7% 73.3%
5500 37.7% 40.2% 43.1% 46.4% 50.2% 54.8% 60.2% 66.9% 75.2%
























































Table 7.5                 Table 7.6 
 
i 
1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0%
35% 1.0% 0.7% 0.3% 0.0% -0.3% -0.7%
40% 1.2% 0.8% 0.4% 0.0% -0.4% -0.8%
45% 1.3% 0.9% 0.4% 0.0% -0.4% -0.8%
50% 1.5% 1.0% 0.5% 0.0% -0.5% -0.9%
55% 1.6% 1.1% 0.5% 0.0% -0.5% -1.0%
60% 1.8% 1.2% 0.6% 0.0% -0.6% -1.1%
65% 1.9% 1.3% 0.6% 0.0% -0.6% -1.2%
70% 2.1% 1.4% 0.7% 0.0% -0.7% -1.3%
75% 2.2% 1.5% 0.7% 0.0% -0.7% -1.4%
80% 2.4% 1.6% 0.8% 0.0% -0.8% -1.5%
85% 2.5% 1.7% 0.8% 0.0% -0.8% -1.6%
90% 2.7% 1.8% 0.9% 0.0% -0.9% -1.7%
95% 2.8% 1.9% 0.9% 0.0% -0.9% -1.8%
100% 3.0% 2.0% 1.0% 0.0% -1.0% -1.9%
110% 3.3% 2.2% 1.1% 0.0% -1.0% -2.1%
120% 3.6% 2.4% 1.2% 0.0% -1.1% -2.3%
130% 3.9% 2.5% 1.3% 0.0% -1.2% -2.5%
140% 4.2% 2.7% 1.4% 0.0% -1.3% -2.6%
150% 4.5% 2.9% 1.5% 0.0% -1.4% -2.8%
160% 4.8% 3.1% 1.6% 0.0% -1.5% -3.0%





















1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0%
35% 1.4% 1.0% 0.7% 0.3% 0.0% -0.3%
40% 1.6% 1.2% 0.8% 0.4% 0.0% -0.4%
45% 1.8% 1.3% 0.9% 0.4% 0.0% -0.4%
50% 2.0% 1.5% 1.0% 0.5% 0.0% -0.5%
55% 2.2% 1.6% 1.1% 0.5% 0.0% -0.5%
60% 2.4% 1.8% 1.2% 0.6% 0.0% -0.6%
65% 2.6% 1.9% 1.3% 0.6% 0.0% -0.6%
70% 2.8% 2.1% 1.4% 0.7% 0.0% -0.7%
75% 3.0% 2.2% 1.5% 0.7% 0.0% -0.7%
80% 3.2% 2.4% 1.6% 0.8% 0.0% -0.8%
85% 3.4% 2.5% 1.7% 0.8% 0.0% -0.8%
90% 3.6% 2.6% 1.7% 0.9% 0.0% -0.8%
95% 3.8% 2.8% 1.8% 0.9% 0.0% -0.9%
100% 4.0% 2.9% 1.9% 1.0% 0.0% -0.9%
110% 4.4% 3.2% 2.1% 1.1% 0.0% -1.0%
120% 4.8% 3.5% 2.3% 1.2% 0.0% -1.1%
130% 5.1% 3.8% 2.5% 1.3% 0.0% -1.2%
140% 5.5% 4.1% 2.7% 1.3% 0.0% -1.3%
150% 5.9% 4.4% 2.9% 1.4% 0.0% -1.4%























1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0%
35% 1.7% 1.4% 1.0% 0.7% 0.3% 0.0%
40% 2.0% 1.6% 1.2% 0.8% 0.4% 0.0%
45% 2.2% 1.8% 1.3% 0.9% 0.4% 0.0%
50% 2.5% 2.0% 1.5% 1.0% 0.5% 0.0%
55% 2.7% 2.2% 1.6% 1.1% 0.5% 0.0%
60% 3.0% 2.4% 1.7% 1.2% 0.6% 0.0%
65% 3.2% 2.5% 1.9% 1.3% 0.6% 0.0%
70% 3.5% 2.7% 2.0% 1.3% 0.7% 0.0%
75% 3.7% 2.9% 2.2% 1.4% 0.7% 0.0%
80% 4.0% 3.1% 2.3% 1.5% 0.8% 0.0%
85% 4.2% 3.3% 2.5% 1.6% 0.8% 0.0%
90% 4.5% 3.5% 2.6% 1.7% 0.9% 0.0%
95% 4.7% 3.7% 2.8% 1.8% 0.9% 0.0%
100% 5.0% 3.9% 2.9% 1.9% 1.0% 0.0%
110% 5.4% 4.3% 3.2% 2.1% 1.0% 0.0%
120% 5.9% 4.7% 3.5% 2.3% 1.1% 0.0%
130% 6.4% 5.1% 3.8% 2.5% 1.2% 0.0%
140% 6.9% 5.5% 4.1% 2.7% 1.3% 0.0%
150% 7.4% 5.9% 4.4% 2.9% 1.4% 0.0%
160% 7.9% 6.3% 4.7% 3.1% 1.5% 0.0%






















1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0%
35% 2.1% 1.7% 1.4% 1.0% 0.7% 0.3%
40% 2.4% 2.0% 1.6% 1.2% 0.8% 0.4%
45% 2.7% 2.2% 1.7% 1.3% 0.9% 0.4%
50% 3.0% 2.5% 1.9% 1.4% 1.0% 0.5%
55% 3.3% 2.7% 2.1% 1.6% 1.0% 0.5%
60% 3.6% 2.9% 2.3% 1.7% 1.1% 0.6%
65% 3.9% 3.2% 2.5% 1.9% 1.2% 0.6%
70% 4.2% 3.4% 2.7% 2.0% 1.3% 0.7%
75% 4.5% 3.7% 2.9% 2.2% 1.4% 0.7%
80% 4.8% 3.9% 3.1% 2.3% 1.5% 0.8%
85% 5.0% 4.2% 3.3% 2.5% 1.6% 0.8%
90% 5.3% 4.4% 3.5% 2.6% 1.7% 0.8%
95% 5.6% 4.7% 3.7% 2.7% 1.8% 0.9%
100% 5.9% 4.9% 3.9% 2.9% 1.9% 0.9%
110% 6.5% 5.4% 4.3% 3.2% 2.1% 1.0%
120% 7.1% 5.9% 4.7% 3.5% 2.3% 1.1%
130% 7.7% 6.4% 5.0% 3.8% 2.5% 1.2%
140% 8.3% 6.9% 5.4% 4.0% 2.7% 1.3%
150% 8.9% 7.4% 5.8% 4.3% 2.9% 1.4%























1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0%
35% 2.4% 2.1% 1.7% 1.3% 1.0% 0.7%
40% 2.8% 2.4% 1.9% 1.5% 1.1% 0.8%
45% 3.1% 2.6% 2.2% 1.7% 1.3% 0.8%
50% 3.5% 2.9% 2.4% 1.9% 1.4% 0.9%
55% 3.8% 3.2% 2.7% 2.1% 1.6% 1.0%
60% 4.2% 3.5% 2.9% 2.3% 1.7% 1.1%
65% 4.5% 3.8% 3.2% 2.5% 1.9% 1.2%
70% 4.9% 4.1% 3.4% 2.7% 2.0% 1.3%
75% 5.2% 4.4% 3.6% 2.9% 2.1% 1.4%
80% 5.5% 4.7% 3.9% 3.1% 2.3% 1.5%
85% 5.9% 5.0% 4.1% 3.3% 2.4% 1.6%
90% 6.2% 5.3% 4.4% 3.5% 2.6% 1.7%
95% 6.6% 5.6% 4.6% 3.7% 2.7% 1.8%
100% 6.9% 5.9% 4.9% 3.8% 2.9% 1.9%
110% 7.6% 6.5% 5.3% 4.2% 3.1% 2.1%
120% 8.3% 7.1% 5.8% 4.6% 3.4% 2.3%
130% 9.0% 7.6% 6.3% 5.0% 3.7% 2.5%
140% 9.7% 8.2% 6.8% 5.4% 4.0% 2.6%
150% 10.4% 8.8% 7.3% 5.8% 4.3% 2.8%
160% 11.1% 9.4% 7.8% 6.2% 4.6% 3.0%






















1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0%
35% 2.8% 2.4% 2.0% 1.7% 1.3% 1.0%
40% 3.2% 2.7% 2.3% 1.9% 1.5% 1.1%
45% 3.6% 3.1% 2.6% 2.2% 1.7% 1.3%
50% 4.0% 3.4% 2.9% 2.4% 1.9% 1.4%
55% 4.4% 3.8% 3.2% 2.6% 2.1% 1.6%
60% 4.8% 4.1% 3.5% 2.9% 2.3% 1.7%
65% 5.1% 4.5% 3.8% 3.1% 2.5% 1.8%
70% 5.5% 4.8% 4.1% 3.4% 2.7% 2.0%
75% 5.9% 5.1% 4.4% 3.6% 2.9% 2.1%
80% 6.3% 5.5% 4.7% 3.8% 3.0% 2.3%
85% 6.7% 5.8% 5.0% 4.1% 3.2% 2.4%
90% 7.1% 6.2% 5.2% 4.3% 3.4% 2.5%
95% 7.5% 6.5% 5.5% 4.6% 3.6% 2.7%
100% 7.9% 6.9% 5.8% 4.8% 3.8% 2.8%
110% 8.7% 7.5% 6.4% 5.3% 4.2% 3.1%
120% 9.5% 8.2% 7.0% 5.8% 4.6% 3.4%
130% 10.3% 8.9% 7.6% 6.3% 5.0% 3.7%
140% 11.1% 9.6% 8.2% 6.7% 5.3% 4.0%
150% 11.9% 10.3% 8.7% 7.2% 5.7% 4.2%



















Necessary Permanent Primary Surplus
9.0%
GDP growth rate  52


















1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0%
35% 3.1% 2.7% 2.4% 2.0% 1.7% 1.3%
40% 3.6% 3.1% 2.7% 2.3% 1.9% 1.5%
45% 4.0% 3.5% 3.1% 2.6% 2.1% 1.7%
50% 4.5% 3.9% 3.4% 2.9% 2.4% 1.9%
55% 4.9% 4.3% 3.7% 3.2% 2.6% 2.1%
60% 5.3% 4.7% 4.1% 3.5% 2.9% 2.3%
65% 5.8% 5.1% 4.4% 3.8% 3.1% 2.5%
70% 6.2% 5.5% 4.8% 4.0% 3.3% 2.6%
75% 6.7% 5.9% 5.1% 4.3% 3.6% 2.8%
80% 7.1% 6.3% 5.4% 4.6% 3.8% 3.0%
85% 7.6% 6.7% 5.8% 4.9% 4.0% 3.2%
90% 8.0% 7.1% 6.1% 5.2% 4.3% 3.4%
95% 8.5% 7.5% 6.5% 5.5% 4.5% 3.6%
100% 8.9% 7.8% 6.8% 5.8% 4.8% 3.8%
110% 9.8% 8.6% 7.5% 6.3% 5.2% 4.2%
120% 10.7% 9.4% 8.2% 6.9% 5.7% 4.5%
130% 11.6% 10.2% 8.8% 7.5% 6.2% 4.9%
140% 12.5% 11.0% 9.5% 8.1% 6.7% 5.3%
150% 13.4% 11.8% 10.2% 8.7% 7.1% 5.7%
160% 14.3% 12.5% 10.9% 9.2% 7.6% 6.0%






















1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0%
35% 3.5% 3.1% 2.7% 2.4% 2.0% 1.7%
40% 4.0% 3.5% 3.1% 2.7% 2.3% 1.9%
45% 4.5% 4.0% 3.5% 3.0% 2.6% 2.1%
50% 5.0% 4.4% 3.9% 3.4% 2.9% 2.4%
55% 5.4% 4.9% 4.3% 3.7% 3.1% 2.6%
60% 5.9% 5.3% 4.7% 4.0% 3.4% 2.8%
65% 6.4% 5.7% 5.0% 4.4% 3.7% 3.1%
70% 6.9% 6.2% 5.4% 4.7% 4.0% 3.3%
75% 7.4% 6.6% 5.8% 5.0% 4.3% 3.5%
80% 7.9% 7.1% 6.2% 5.4% 4.6% 3.8%
85% 8.4% 7.5% 6.6% 5.7% 4.9% 4.0%
90% 8.9% 7.9% 7.0% 6.1% 5.1% 4.2%
95% 9.4% 8.4% 7.4% 6.4% 5.4% 4.5%
100% 9.9% 8.8% 7.8% 6.7% 5.7% 4.7%
110% 10.9% 9.7% 8.5% 7.4% 6.3% 5.2%
120% 11.9% 10.6% 9.3% 8.1% 6.9% 5.7%
130% 12.9% 11.5% 10.1% 8.8% 7.4% 6.1%
140% 13.9% 12.4% 10.9% 9.4% 8.0% 6.6%
150% 14.9% 13.2% 11.7% 10.1% 8.6% 7.1%























1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0%
35% 3.8% 3.4% 3.1% 2.7% 2.3% 2.0%
40% 4.4% 3.9% 3.5% 3.1% 2.7% 2.3%
45% 4.9% 4.4% 3.9% 3.5% 3.0% 2.5%
50% 5.4% 4.9% 4.4% 3.8% 3.3% 2.8%
55% 6.0% 5.4% 4.8% 4.2% 3.7% 3.1%
60% 6.5% 5.9% 5.2% 4.6% 4.0% 3.4%
65% 7.1% 6.4% 5.7% 5.0% 4.3% 3.7%
70% 7.6% 6.9% 6.1% 5.4% 4.7% 4.0%
75% 8.2% 7.4% 6.6% 5.8% 5.0% 4.2%
80% 8.7% 7.8% 7.0% 6.2% 5.3% 4.5%
85% 9.3% 8.3% 7.4% 6.5% 5.7% 4.8%
90% 9.8% 8.8% 7.9% 6.9% 6.0% 5.1%
95% 10.3% 9.3% 8.3% 7.3% 6.3% 5.4%
100% 10.9% 9.8% 8.7% 7.7% 6.7% 5.7%
110% 12.0% 10.8% 9.6% 8.5% 7.3% 6.2%
120% 13.1% 11.8% 10.5% 9.2% 8.0% 6.8%
130% 14.2% 12.7% 11.4% 10.0% 8.7% 7.4%
140% 15.2% 13.7% 12.2% 10.8% 9.3% 7.9%
150% 16.3% 14.7% 13.1% 11.5% 10.0% 8.5%
160% 17.4% 15.7% 14.0% 12.3% 10.7% 9.1%
























Ades, A., F. Kaune, P. Leme, R. Masih and D. Tenengauzer (2000). A New Framework 
for Assessing Fair Value in Emerging Markets Hard-Currency Debt. Global Economics. 
Paper No. 45. June 2000. 
 
Barro R. and X. Sala-i-Martin (1995). Economic Growth. Mc Graw Hill. 1995. 
 
Calvo, G., A. Izquierdo and E. Talvi (2002). Suden Stops, the Real Exchange Rate and 
Fiscal Sustainability: Argentina’s Lessons. Background paper for t he seminar The 
Resurgence of Macro Crises: Causes and Implications for Latin America. Fortaleza, 
Brazil. Annual Meetings of the Board of Governors, Inter-American Development Bank 
and Inter-American Investment Corporation. March 11, 2002. 
 
Caprio, G., P. H onohan and D. Vittas (2002). Financial Sector Policy for Developing 
Countries: A Reader. Oxford University Press, World Bank. August 2002. 
 
Castro, C. (2002).  Aplicación del enfoque IRB para el sistema financiero argentino 
utilizando datos de la Central de Deudores. Mimeo, BCRA. 
 
Deutsche Bank (2000). Global Markets Research. Current Account Sustainability. March 
2000. 
 
Edwards, S. (2001). Does the Current Account Matter? Prepared for the NBER’s 
conference on Crisis Prevention. Florida, USA, January 2001. 
 
Glick, R. and M. Hutchison (1999). Banking and Currency Crises: How Common are 
Twins? Pacific Basin Working Paper Series, Working Paper PB99-07. 
 
Hausmann R. and A. Velasco (2002). The Argentine Collapse: hard Money’s Soft 
Underbelly. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, April 2002. 
 
JPMorgan (2000). Russia: A Rough Guide to the Prin/IAN Exchange for 2010 & 2030 
Eurobonds. 
 
Kaminsky G. L. and C. Reinhart (1999). The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and 
Balance-of-Payments Problems. The American Economic Review 89(3), 473-500.  
 
Levy Yeyati E. and F. Sturzenegger (2002). Dollarization.  Forthcoming MIT Press. 
November 2002. 
 
Merril Lynch (2002). Emerging Markets Debt Monthly. 1 August 2002. 
   54
Mussa, M. (2002). Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy. Policy Analyses 
in International Economics, No. 67 (July). Washington, DC: Institute for International 
Economics. 
 
Powell, A. and F. Sturzenegger (2002).  Dollarization: The Link Between Devaluation 
Risk and Default Risk, in E. Levy-Yeyati and F. Sturzenegger eds., Dollarization, 
forthcoming MIT Press. 
 
Sturzenegger F. (2002). Default Episodes in the 1990s: Factbook and Preliminary 
Lessons. MIMEO, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. 
 
 
 Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Business School Working Papers 
 
Working Papers  2003 
Nº16  "Business Cycle and Macroeconomic Policy Coordination in MERCOSUR" 
Martín Gonzalez Rozada (UTDT) y José Fanelli (CEDES). 
Nº15  "The Fiscal Spending Gap and the Procyclicality of Public Expenditure" 
Eduardo Levy Yeyati (UTDT) y Sebastián Galiani (UDESA). 
Nº14  "Financial Dollarization and Debt Deflation under a Currency Board" 
Eduardo Levy Yeyati (UTDT), Ernesto Schargrodsky (UTDT) y Sebastián Galiani (UDESA). 
 Nº13 "¿ Po  qué crecen menos los regímenes de tipo de cambio fijo? El efecto de los Sudden 
Stops", Federico Stuzenegger (UTDT). 
 Nº12  Concentration and Foreign Penetration in Latin American Banking Sec ors: Impact on 
Competition and Risk", Eduardo Levy Yeyati (UTDT) y Alejandro Micco (IADB). 
 Nº11  Default`s in the 1990`s: What have we learned?", 








Nº10 "Un año de medición del Indice de Demanda Laboral: situación actual y perspectivas , 
Victoria Lamdany (UTDT) y Luciana Monteverde (UTDT) 
Nº09 "Liquidity Protection versus Moral Hazard: The Role of the IMF", 
Andrew Powell (UTDT) y Leandro Arozamena (UTDT) 
 Nº08 "Financial Dedollarization: A Carrot and Stick Approach", Eduardo Levy Yeyati (UTDT) 
 Nº07 "The Price of Inconvertible Deposits: The Stock Market Boom during the Argentine crisis", 
Eduardo Levy Yeyati (UTDT), Sergio Schmukler (WB) y Neeltje van Horen (WB) 
Nº06  "Aftermaths of Current Account Crisis: Export Growth or Import Contraction?", 
Federico Sturzenegger (UTDT), Pablo Guidotti (UTDT) y Agustín Villar (BIS) 
 Nº05  Regional Integration and the Location of FDI", 
Eduardo Levy Yeyati (UTDT), Christian Daude (UM ) y Ernesto Stein (BID) 
 Nº04 "A new test for the success of inflation targeting", 
Andrew Powell (UTDT), Martin Gonzalez Rozada (UTDT) y Verónica Cohen Sabbán (BCRA) 
 Nº03 "Living and Dying with Ha d Pegs: The Rise and Fall of Argentina´s Currency Board", 
Eduardo Levy Yeyati (UTDT), Augusto de la Torre (WB) y Sergio Schmukler (WB) 
 Nº02 "The Cyclical Nature of FDI flows , 
Eduardo Levy Yeyati (UTDT), Ugo Panizza (BID) y Ernesto Stein (BID)  Nº01 "Endogenous Deposit Dollarization", 
Eduardo Levy Yeyati (UTDT) y Christian Broda (FRBNY) 
 
Working Papers 2002 
Nº15 "The FTAA and the Location of FDI", 
Eduardo Levy Yeyati (UTDT), Christian Daude (UM ) y Ernesto Stein ( BID) 
Nº14 "Macroeconomic Coordination and Moneta y Unions in a N-country World: Do all Roads 
Lead to Rome?" 
Federico Sturzenegger (UTDT) y Andrew Powell (UTDT) 
Nº13  Reforming Capital Requirements in Emerging Countries" 
Andrew Powell (UTDT), Verónica Balzarotti (BCRA) y Christian Castro (UPF) 
Nº12 "Toolkit for the Analysis of Debt Problems , Federico Sturzenegger (UTDT) 
Nº11 "On the Endogeneity of Exchange Rate Regimes", 
Eduardo Levy Yeyati (UTDT), Federico Sturzenegger (UTDT) e Iliana Reggio (UCLA) 
Nº10 "Defaults in the 90´s: Factbook and Preliminary Lessons", Federico Sturzenegger (UTDT) 
Nº09 "Countries with international payments´ difficulties: what can the IMF do?" 
Andrew Powell (UTDT) 
Nº08 "The Argentina Crisis: Bad Luck, Bad Management, Bad Politics, Bad Advice",  
Andrew Powell (UTDT) 
Nº07 "Capital Inflows and Capital Outflows: Measurement, Determinants, Consequences", 
Andrew Powell (UTDT), Dilip Ratha (WB) y Sanket Mohapatra (CU) 
Nº06 "Banking on Foreigners: The Behaviour of International Bank Lending to Latin America, 
1985-2000", 
Andrew Powell (UTDT), María Soledad Martinez Peria (WB) y Ivanna Vladkova ( IMF) 
Nº05 "Classifying Exchange Rate Regimes: Deeds vs. Words" 





r Nº04"The Effect of Product Market Competition on Capital Structu e: Empirical Evidence from the 
Newspaper Industry", Ernesto Schargrodsky (UTDT) 
Nº03 "Financial globalization: Unequal blessings", 
Augusto de la Torre (World Bank), Eduardo Levy Yeyati (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella) y Sergio 
L. Schmukler (World Bank) 
Nº02 "Inference and estimation in small sample dynamic panel data models", 
Sebastian Galiani (UdeSA) y Martin Gonzalez-Rozada (UTDT) 
Nº01 "Why have poverty and income inequality increased so much? Argentina 1991-2002", 
Martín González-Rozada, (UTDT) y Alicia Menendez, (Princeton University).   